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ABSTRACT
Becker, Ralph A. A COLD WAR EPISODE: DÉTENTE AND U.S. RELATIONS WITH
PAKISTAN DURING THE 1971 SOUTH ASIA CRISIS. Unpublished Master of
Arts thesis, University of Northern Colorado, 2012.

The Cold War defined a state of conflict between the U.S., China, and the Soviet
Union during the nuclear age that followed World War II. During the Cold War the
United States practiced a foreign policy that was episodic in nature as the great nations
recruited the developing countries of the Third World to carry on their ideological
struggles. This policy meant that the U.S. would aggressively intervene during periods of
war in developing countries in order to prevent the spread of communism. Yet, after the
episode ended, the U.S. would quickly vacate the region and move on to other areas to
fight its Cold War battles and counter communist advances throughout the Third World.
The détente initiative of President Richard M. Nixon demonstrates this episodic
tendency in U.S. foreign policy. Détente provided the U.S., China, and the Soviet Union
with a platform to negotiate their differences, along with economic, political, and military
inducements that were mutually beneficial to all parties. Détente began as Nixon
established a diplomatic opening to China in 1971, with the assistance of Pakistan’s
President, Yahya Khan, to act as an intermediary between the U.S. and China.
The U.S. had not given much attention to Pakistan previously, but détente caused
Nixon to focus his attention sharply on Pakistan. As plans were underway for Nixon to
visit China, Pakistan became involved in a civil war. Yahya Khan initiated a violent
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suppression of the Bengali people in East Pakistan which led to atrocities committed
against his own people. Nixon remained silent on these issues in order to protect détente.
Yahya’s atrocities outraged in the international community, and India eventually
intervened on behalf of the Bengali people, leading to war between Pakistan and India.
This war started the South Asia Crisis.
This thesis argues that détente caused the South Asia Crisis, that the crisis
threatened to destroy détente, and that détente itself brought an end to the crisis. The
U.S. and China were allied with Pakistan, and the Soviet Union was allied with India.
Nixon’s failure to curb Yahya’s atrocities led to Indian intervention. The ensuing crisis
threatened to ruin détente as Nixon confronted a Soviet/Indian alliance that was
determined to crush all of Pakistan. This essay argues that Nixon made the correct
assessment of Indian/Soviet intentions during the South Asia Crisis. The regional
conflict between India and Pakistan escalated into a potential Cold War conflict between
the U.S., China, and the Soviet Union. Nixon confronted the Soviets and warned of U.S.
intervention in the war on behalf of Pakistan, thereby risking détente. The Soviet Union
desired to insure that détente remained intact based on its own interests in potential gains,
and agreed to use its influence to restrain India and end the crisis.
The South Asia Crisis demonstrates the episodic nature of U.S. relations with the
Third World during the Cold War. With détente secured, Nixon quickly turned his
attention away from Pakistan. Once the U.S. was convinced that the Soviet-backed
Indian military would not continue its military campaign against Pakistan, the U.S.
quickly moved on to other Cold War concerns. This became a pattern of U.S. action
during the Cold War, and the episodic nature of U.S./Pakistani relations continues today.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER
I.

INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………...1
The Episodic Nature of U.S. Relations with the Third World in
General and Pakistan in Particular

II.

DÉTENTE CAUSES THE SOUTH ASIA CRISIS……………………..23
Nixon’s Failure to Adequately Address Atrocities by Pakistan
During Its Civil War Resulted in Intervention by India

III.

DÉTENTE THREATENED DURING THE SOUTH ASIA CRISIS..….51
War between Pakistan and India Threatens to Become a
Cold War Confrontation between the Great Powers
that could End Détente

IV.

DÉTENTE BRINGS AN END TO THE SOUTH ASIA CRISIS…...…..85
Nixon Risks Détente and Warns the Soviet Union that
He Intends To Intervene on Behalf of Pakistan

V.

CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………108
The Episodic Nature of U.S. Relations with Pakistan Continues

BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………120

vi

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank my three faculty advisors for their guidance and direction during
this thesis project. To Dr. Aaron Haberman, my faculty chair, for his patience, clarity of
focus, and persistence which enabled me to accomplish a final project that I can be proud
of, and helped me to become a better writer and communicator. To Dr. Michael Welsh,
whose love for his students is clear through his actions and encouragement, and who
went through many red ink markers on my behalf in order to improve my writing and
research. To Dr. Adam Fong, whose sharp intellect helped keep me on track, and for the
excellent resource material he provided. To my friend, Tom Schemp, who helped me
immensely with the final formatting of this project. To Mark Anderson, for his help with
researching government documents. I also want to thank my wonderful wife, Sharon, for
her prayers, assistance, support, and encouragement. She is the joy of my life, my
inspiration, and my Sweetie. And finally, I also wish to thank my Lord and Savior, Jesus
Christ, who gave to me an ability to accomplish something that I was not capable of
accomplishing on my own. As I relied on him to show me the way, he guided my
thoughts and ideas at times when I felt overwhelmed by the enormity of this project. He,
along with my faculty advisors, enabled me to successfully complete a research project
far beyond anything I ever thought possible, and they must receive equal credit for any
successes contained herein, along with my gratitude and my humble, heartfelt thanks.

vii

1

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Episodic Nature of U.S. Relations with the Third World
in General and Pakistan in Particular
The Cold War grew out of World War II tensions between the Soviet Union and
the United States. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union sought to expand their political
ideologies throughout the post-war world. The developing nations of the world became
indirectly involved in the Cold War through their associations with the United States, the
Soviet Union, and Communist China. These developing nations, known as the Third
World, often became allied with the major Cold War powers. Through these alliances the
great nations of the post-war world promoted their political ideologies (communism or
capitalism) and recruited Third World peoples to join them in accomplishing their
objectives.
The primary question this thesis seeks to answer is how the Cold War shaped the
way the United States approached the Third World. The Cold War caused the U.S. to
address the Third World based on American concerns over communist expansion. The
U.S. desired to contain communism as much as possible which led to a get-in and get-out
strategy in the Third World that was based on addressing the multiple threats of
communist expansion around the globe, and the wars associated with them. This resulted
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in an episodic pattern of U.S. involvement in the Third World during the Cold War. The
U.S. did not practice a policy of long-term investment in the Third World (except perhaps
when significant American economic interests were involved). Essentially, American
political involvement limited itself to a get-in and get-out approach. When American
Cold War interests peaked in a country or a region, then America would be heavily
involved there for a season, but when the episode of crisis or conflict passed, the United
States would then move on to the next location of Soviet or Chinese global activity to act
as a wall against communist advance.
After the communist takeover of China in 1949, the United States broke off all
diplomatic ties with the country. Two decades later, President Richard M. Nixon desired
to change this policy through an initiative known as détente. Its goals were to improve
diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and China, to negotiate reductions in nuclear
armaments, and to reduce Cold War tensions as much as possible. Détente could not
bring peace to the world, but it could enable Cold War adversaries to address their issues
in a new context that involved less tension between them. As was true in each Cold War
episode, the Americans, the Soviets, and the Chinese would continue to promote their
individual ideologies in spite of détente. Nixon understood this was the nature of global
Cold War politics and he accepted this as reality. He was willing to accept the Soviets
and the Chinese as they were, without attempting to change them. Détente sought
restraint rather than confrontation and provided the means for dialogue among Cold War
enemies with the understanding that each party had a clear agenda it consistently pursued.
Nixon was willing to work in this context with the Soviet Union and China without
insisting each country modify its agenda. Instead, détente would find ways to
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accommodate mutually shared interests, to negotiate on interests that were unrealistic or
inflammatory, and to attempt to make the post-war world less volatile.
Tension between the Soviet Union and Communist China was a situation Nixon
wanted to take advantage of. Nixon’s combined visits to both Chinese Party Chairman
Mao Tse-tung and Soviet General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev in their respective
countries in early 1972 were crucial to détente. Nixon understood that his visit to China
would soften Soviet stubbornness when it came to arms negotiations. Building
diplomatic bridges to both countries simultaneously would provide the necessary
leverage for dialogue to begin between all three superpowers. This would enable the
beginning of détente to take place. Nixon understood that the link to China was the key
to détente with the Russians. American relations with the Soviets could be greatly
influenced by American relations with the Chinese. Nixon knew that he could capitalize
politically on Chinese and Soviet suspicions toward one another due to his visits as they
wondered what secret negotiations might be taking place.1
Nixon’s first step in beginning his détente initiative was to establish a diplomatic
opening with the Chinese after two decades of diplomatic silence between the U.S. and
China. To do this he needed an intermediary in order to gain the trust of the Chinese.
This opportunity presented itself through Pakistan. Pakistan’s President, Yahya Khan,
provided the best channel for Nixon to establish détente with the Chinese due to
Pakistan’s alliances with both the U.S. and China, but Yahya was attempting to restore
order to a politically volatile situation inside Pakistan that threatened the stability of the

1

Stephen Ambrose, “1971-1975: Approaching the Apocalypse,” The Century: America’s Time, with Peter
Jennings, Volume 5, ABC News-History Channel, (California: Buena Vista Home Entertainment, Inc. D5265,
1999).
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country. The political problems of Pakistan had already caused the previous president,
Ayub Khan, to step down in March, 1969. The political situation evolved into a civil war
in the eastern wing of a geographically and politically divided Pakistan that would
threaten Nixon’s plans. Pakistan’s civil war would send a flood of refugees into
neighboring India, which caused India to intervene, resulting in the South Asia Crisis.
This essay argues that détente caused the South Asia Crisis, that the crisis itself
nearly destroyed détente, and that ultimately détente was the reason the crisis ended. For
a brief four week period in the late fall of 1971, détente triggered an Indian invasion of
East Pakistan, but also enabled Nixon to end the crisis in less than a month. The South
Asia Crisis had the potential to completely end détente and in a worst case scenario it
could have triggered a world war based on the various alliances involved. For a few
weeks in November and December of 1971, America, the Soviet Union, and Communist
China had their eyes fixed on South Asia in a Cold War episode involving all three
nuclear superpowers. As the Soviets gave abundant military support to India, the U.S.
wrestled with how to help Pakistan during a regional war that contained global
implications.
Nixon’s détente initiative caused the South Asia Crisis. When the civil war between
East and West Pakistan developed, Nixon came under domestic pressure to intervene and
help the East Pakistani refugees. Anything Nixon did in a public platform that was
critical of Pakistan could threaten détente, so he remained silent.2 Nixon was also
determined to avoid involvement in another Asian civil war. In order to preserve his
diplomatic channel to Peking, Nixon provided U.S. aid for Pakistani refugees, but
maintained his silence over atrocities that were being committed by the leadership of
2

Robert Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power (New York: Harper Collins, 2007), 336.
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Pakistan during the civil war. India asked Nixon to use his influence with Pakistan to
curb the violence being perpetrated upon the Bengali people by Yahya’s rampaging
military, but Nixon refused in order to protect détente. India then began to equip and
train the Bengali resistance, and ultimately went to war on their behalf.3
The South Asia Crisis threatened to end détente as it developed into a significant
Cold War confrontation between the great powers. The South Asia Crisis took place
while détente was still in its formative stages. Détente remained fragile and American
international relationships with China and the Soviet Union were tentative throughout
Pakistan’s civil war and its subsequent war with India. Initially, Nixon desired to protect
détente by avoiding public comment on Yahya’s atrocities in East Pakistan, but Indian
intervention escalated the conflict. Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs,
Henry A. Kissinger, then made a veiled threat to India of a U.S., China, and Pakistani
alliance against India should it decide to invade East Pakistan to help the Bengali
resistance. This was done to pressure India into peace negotiations in order to protect
détente and restrain any aggressive intentions, but India immediately entered into an
alliance with the Soviet Union which threatened détente on a much broader scale.
Tensions between the three major superpowers automatically increased when India
initiated war with Pakistan. Due to the alliances involved, détente was placed in
jeopardy as the U.S., Pakistan, and China opposed the Soviet Union and India.
The argument put forth here is that Nixon and Kissinger were correct in their
assessment that India planned to crush all of Pakistan. The two men feared that an Indian

3

“Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President
Nixon,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976 Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971, Document
195, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v11/d195 (accessed January 25, 2012).
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war with Pakistan could threaten not only East Pakistan but West Pakistan as well.
Nixon and Kissinger believed India planned to defeat Yahya’s forces in East Pakistan and
then continue into West Pakistan to crush all of Pakistan’s fighting ability and
permanently cripple the country. U.S. and Pakistani diplomats, as well as journalists and
historians, have believed India merely wanted to insure the establishment of an
independent Bangladesh, protect Pakistani refugees, and restore order in the region. This
would be India’s publicly declared position as well. Yet, Nixon and Kissinger were
convinced that India wanted to crush all of Pakistan’s military once war in the East was
won. This would insure India’s security and guarantee that Pakistan could never again
raise a hand against it.4
Détente brought an end to the South Asia Crisis as Nixon confronted the Soviets.
The Soviet Union was largely responsible for India’s emboldened state of aggression
against Pakistan during the South Asia Crisis. As the crisis escalated Nixon explained to
the Russians that Soviet support for India against an American-allied Pakistan could
threaten the relationship between America and the Soviet Union. During the South Asia
Crisis, Nixon was forced to risk détente and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the
Soviets. Nixon was already scheduled to meet with Brezhnev in Moscow in the spring of
1972 when the Soviets blatantly armed India against Pakistan in the summer of 1971.
Nixon could not restrain Soviet ambitions in South Asia until he threatened U.S. military
intervention and warned that Soviet actions could endanger détente. Moscow desired to
participate in detente for several reasons. The Soviet Union wanted to impede a possible

4

“Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 19691976 Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971, Document 255,
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v11/d255 (accessed August 2, 2012).
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Chinese/American agreement aimed against it.5 They also desired a means to limit
American production and proliferation of nuclear technologies. The Soviets did not want
to see Germany building a significant military once again, and “were intent on reaching
agreements on troop levels in central Europe.”6 “Moscow also expected détente to lead
to expanded U.S./Soviet trade, especially in grain sales, which it badly needed to feed its
people and others in Eastern Europe.”7 After Nixon’s warning that détente was at risk,
the Soviet Union agreed to use its influence to restrain India once East Pakistan was
defeated. Continuing the war into West Pakistan would be avoided in order to protect
Soviet interests in détente. In this way détente brought an end to the South Asia Crisis.
A number of U.S. and Pakistani officials believed that the South Asia Crisis was
merely a regional conflict with little Cold War significance. India would assert that its
invasion of East Pakistan held no motive beyond relieving the suffering of the Bengali
people at the hands of Pakistan’s military, establishing an independent homeland for
them, and stopping the flow of refugees into India. Subsequent historical scholarship has
taken these claims at face value and has therefore not viewed the South Asia Crisis as a
significant Cold War event. Major Cold War historical works often omit the South Asia
Crisis or minimize it, choosing instead to focus on an alleged overreaction to events by
Nixon and Kissinger. Yet, the view that India desired to seize East Pakistan and then
crush West Pakistan’s military as well, leaving all of Pakistan crippled and helpless,
remained the analysis of events according to Nixon and Kissinger. Nixon justifiably
opposed India and its Soviet ally, creating a significant Cold War confrontation.

5

Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power, 287.
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6
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The episodic U.S. relationship with Pakistan throughout the Cold War, and the
American get-in and get-out approach to the Third World caused Nixon and Kissinger to
seriously underestimate the level of hostility between Pakistan and India. Nixon and
Kissinger held a clear picture of themselves as prestigious global statesmen, able to
overcome Cold War obstacles, and establish a new foreign policy that would guarantee
their place in history. Yet, the South Asia Crisis would prove to be a serious challenge to
their abilities as statesmen, and it regularly threatened to overturn their détente initiative.
Pakistan and India fought a war in 1947 after the partition of India by the British. The
two countries again went to war in 1965, causing a U.S. military embargo of both
nations. In 1971 there would be a third India/Pakistan war, and even though Nixon
understood the history of South Asia, he did not understand the depth of the animosity
between Pakistan and India or the hostility that it could provoke.
This thesis makes important contributions toward understanding the often
episodic and temporary role that Third World countries played in the larger Cold War
struggles. The Western democracies of North America and Europe (First World) were
perpetually engaged in an ideological struggle against the Soviet Union and Communist
China (Second World) throughout the Cold War. The Third World was the term given to
the unaligned developing countries around the globe that were often the poorest among
nations. Older historical works did not devote a great deal of attention to the Third
World when dealing with Cold War history. The writings of John Lewis Gaddis and
William Appleman Williams illustrate this. Gaddis and Williams discuss the causes of
the Cold War and their arguments demonstrate contrasts between the U.S. and the Soviet
Union without spending much time as to how the Third World related to larger Cold War
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struggles. Their works were designed to define the origins of the Cold War and to outline
the contrasts in ideologies between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
There existed a debate between Gaddis and Williams as to the origins and causes
of the Cold War, but their discussion of the Third World was minimal. In his book, We
Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (1997), Gaddis argued that Stalin and his
authoritarian regime caused the Cold War.8 According to Gaddis it was the expansionist
agenda and unstable personalities of men like Stalin and Khrushchev that drove the Cold
War and gave rise to America’s policy of containment. Gaddis believed that once
Stalin’s rule was secure and it was clear that the Soviet Union would survive World War
II, “there was going to be a Cold War whatever the west did,” and it was
“authoritarianism in general, and Stalin in particular” that caused it.9 Gaddis focused on
the expansionist goals of the Soviet Union, and assumed that America had no such
ideology.
On the other hand, Williams, in The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (1959),
argued that the U.S. also had an expansionist agenda during the Cold War based on a
global “Open Door” economic policy. Williams mentioned the Third World only as it
related to U.S. economic development and potential U.S. exploitation. The Open Door
Policy of the United States “was based on an economic definition of the world”10
designed to expand American markets and promote Western ideology. Williams said
that, “When an advanced industrial nation plays…a controlling role in the development
of a weaker economy, then the policy of the more powerful country can …be described
8

John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (New York: Oxford University Press,
1997), 292-294.
9
Ibid., 294.
10
William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: W.W. Norton &
Company, 2009), 229.
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as imperial.”11 Williams argued that the Soviets wanted to contain American imperialism
just as the U.S. desired to contain communism. According to Williams, the expansionist
policies of the U.S. contributed to the Cold War as much as Soviet expansionist policies.
America did not practice colonialism the way Europe did before World War I, but, the
U.S. held to an ideology which insisted “that other people cannot really solve their
problems and improve their lives unless they go about it in the same way as the United
States.”12 Williams argued that this imposed a subtle imperialistic tendency in that even
though America did not hold a governing influence over a developing country, it often
held an ideological influence that remained in the fabric of the culture. The U.S. had
traditionally demonstrated generous humanitarianism in its foreign policy, but the policy
was often undercut by the U.S. trying to make other cultures into the likeness of
Americans, thereby hindering the right of self-determination in other nations.13
Gaddis and Williams do not discuss the Third World to any great degree.
Pakistan is rarely mentioned in We Now Know because it was considered largely
irrelevant to Gaddis as a Cold War participant. Gaddis mentions the plan of U.S.
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles (1953-1959) to bind Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and
Pakistan firmly to the West, and thereby create a “geostrategic Great Wall” to keep the
Soviet Union and China “from projecting their influence.”14 In this way the U.S. would
be able to contain communist expansion into the Middle East, and limit the threats to
freedom posed by the Soviet Union and the Red Chinese. Apart from this, Pakistan is not
discussed. Williams does not mention Pakistan or the South Asia Crisis because The

11
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Ibid., 13.
13
Ibid., 88.
14
Gaddis, We Now Know, 169.
12

11

Tragedy of American Diplomacy predated the crisis, and he sought to outline the causes
of the Cold War more than its relation to the Third World.
After the turn of the century, Cold War historians began to focus much more
closely on the role of the Third World in the Cold War. In The Global Cold War (2005),
author Odd Arne Westad describes the Cold War as “aggressive containment without a
state of war” between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.15 He concentrates on the Third
World as becoming a central stage during the Cold War, but unlike European
colonialism, “Moscow’s and Washington’s objectives were not exploitation or
subjugation, but control and improvement.”16 Like the U.S., the Soviets believed theirs
was a global mission to relieve injustice and oppression. Based largely on Bolshevik
successes in 1917, “the Soviet elite firmly believed that socialism would replace
capitalism as the main international system within a generation.”17 Westad “argues that
the United States and the Soviet Union were driven to intervene in the Third World by
the ideologies inherent in their politics,”18 and that “Washington and Moscow needed to
change the world in order to prove the universal applicability of their ideologies.”19 The
Stalinist belief that the world was at the brink of a new age in which communism and
socialism would replace all other economic realities caused the U.S.S.R. to develop an
aggressive foreign policy to facilitate this perceived inevitability. The Bolsheviks set up
the Communist International, or Comintern, as a world-wide organization headquartered

15

Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 2.
16
Ibid., 5.
17
Ibid., 72.
18
Ibid., 4.
19
Ibid.
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in Moscow, to help foster these “inevitable” revolutions that would bring down the
oppressive regimes of capitalism.20
This ideology propelled the Soviet Union to intervene in South Asia. Like
Williams, Westad revealed that the competing ideologies of capitalism and communism
provoked expansionist agendas in order to validate the conviction of each that they
possessed the political solution to the needs of the Third World. It was consistent with
Soviet ideology to come to the aid of the oppressed and poverty-stricken Bengali people
of East Pakistan by assisting India as it opposed the oppressive regime of Pakistan’s
Yahya Khan. In fact, it was an ideological necessity for the Soviets to intervene.
Believing that armed resistance brought freedom and justice to oppressed peoples, the
Soviets invested massive amounts of military hardware in support of India as it fought the
oppression and brutality toward the Bengali people in East Pakistan. The Soviet Union
intervened in the South Asia Crisis to accomplish its Cold War objectives using the Third
World to provide the platform.
Westad discussed one of the primary political movements that caused the great
nations of the Cold War to give greater notice to the Third World. The 1955 AsianAfrican conference in Bandung, Indonesia, was a Third World movement initiated “by
the leaders of five Asian states: Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Burma, and Sri Lanka.”21 The
Bandung conference demonstrated a show of solidarity among Third World leaders, who
then called upon the Western powers to exercise restraint and responsibility. The fact
that the West had fought two world wars and now possessed massive nuclear armaments
was worrisome to the Third World. Bandung also encouraged an attitude of

20
21

Ibid., 49.
Ibid., 99.
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nonalignment in the Third World when it came to reliance on the superpower nations.
Westad said, “Lecturing the superpowers on the conduct of international relations was a
powerful sign that the Third World was coming of age.”22 Westad quotes Secretary of
State, John Foster Dulles, as saying, “the scene of the battle between the free world and
the Communist world was shifting,”23 due to the fact that the Third World countries had
gained the ability to act in unison. By the late 1950s, the U.S., the Soviet Union, and the
Communist Chinese grew increasingly interested in the developing countries of the Third
World as legitimate Cold War allies.
The Third World provided the stage for the U.S., the Soviet Union, and
Communist China to wage their Cold War battles using conventional weapons.
According to Jeremi Suri in Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of
Détente (2003), the U.S. and the Soviets had concluded a Limited Test Ban Treaty in the
1960s and had come to a place of coexistence, but coexistence was not the same as
cooperation.24 Washington and Moscow “frequently employed proxies to avoid the risk
of direct confrontation.”25 Each superpower “supported local wars…along capitalist and
communist lines” among the various states of the Third World.26 These interventions
became prevalent during the Cold War. Suri explained that “Cold War competition
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union continued, but in places unlikely to trigger nuclear
armageddon.”27

22
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Détente did not have the ability to change the foundational opposition that existed
between capitalism and communism during the Cold War. Détente was a visionary plan
by Richard Nixon to provide practical solutions to complicated problems between nations
with vastly different interests. The Soviets, the Americans, and the Communist Chinese
worked within a fragile framework of cooperation during détente, but each superpower
still intently pursued its own Cold War objectives. The basis for détente cooperation was
rooted in self-interest as the three great Cold War nations negotiated based on their own
interests. In Henry Kissinger and the American Century (2007), Suri wrote that through
détente the U.S. accepted “the permanence of its adversaries,” and used “its power for
competitive leverage.”28 Suri points out that in the Third World the U.S. attached
American foreign policy “to a set of brutal dictators who could wield regional force in
ways that served U.S. international interests, often with grave human costs for their
societies.”29 Suri does not comment on this, but Yahya Khan’s military regime in
Pakistan was one of these Third World dictatorial regimes embraced by the U.S. in order
to advance American Cold War interests.
Nixon accepted the reality that none of the great nations could change the political
philosophies of the other. Détente did not require such changes to be effective. It offered
a means of accommodating the interests of the various Cold War powers, and also
provided a means of defusing domestic political problems. Suri argues that détente “had
a social origin” and became “a convergent response to disorder among the great
powers.”30 Suri shows that major cities around the world experienced student protests or

28

Jeremi Suri, Henry Kissinger and the American Century (Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 2007), 247.
29
Ibid., 241.
30
Suri, Power and Protest, 2.

15

other significant political protests from within. Suri argues that “a burst of violent energy
convulsed every major society” during this period, and the Beatles’ song “Revolution”
became a mantra among youth protestors.31 Suri believes that “détente was…a direct
reaction to the “global disruption” of 1968…and “policymakers cooperated to protect
their authority against a wide range of internal challengers.”32 Détente “offered
communist leaders…that did not possess a popular base at home” a way “to bolster their
domestic standing.”33 Summit meetings “made government officials look strong and
powerful” and could be used “to condemn their internal critics for threatening
international peace and the dignity of the state.”34 The baby boomers of the 1940s
became the student protesters of the 1960s on a global scale, and Suri argued that the
student protest movements of 1968 helped give rise to détente.
Robert Dallek takes the argument of Third World importance to the Cold War to
the next level. Westad demonstrated the ideological necessity for the U.S. and the Soviet
Union to intervene in the Third World. Suri pointed out that the détente era accepted the
reality that Cold War adversaries were permanent, and rather than trying to defeat them,
Kissinger desired to use power to gain leverage and negotiate wherever possible. Suri
also revealed the global social unrest that contributed to the success of détente. In Nixon
and Kissinger: Partners in Power (2007), Dallek reveals the tensions that existed
between Nixon and Kissinger as both men sought to become the preeminent statesman of
their day. Regarding the Third World, Dallek concentrates primarily on Vietnam and the
Middle East during the Nixon presidency, but he also focuses intently on the South Asia
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Crisis. His treatment of the subject is brief, but it demonstrates a significant viewpoint
among historians as to how Nixon handled the South Asia Crisis. Dallek did not believe
that the South Asia Crisis was a legitimate confrontation between Cold War rivals, until
Nixon and Kissinger made it so.
Dallek believed that Richard Nixon’s tilt toward Pakistan during the South Asia
Crisis was a foreign policy blunder.35 He was convinced that Nixon and Kissinger
overreacted by viewing the South Asia Crisis as an extension of the Cold War conflict
rather than just a regional war between Pakistan and India.36 Dallek argues that because
Nixon and Kissinger misread the situation, they began a reckless discussion of a possible
war with the Soviet Union.37 The records do show that discussion did take place between
Nixon and Kissinger regarding the possibility of War with the Soviets, but Dallek offers
no analysis as to why the two men might have had good reason to discuss this.
Dallek reveals that Kissinger’s fear of a Cold War confrontation in South Asia
between the Americans, the Soviets, and the Chinese, intensified after his secret trip to
China via Pakistan in July of 1971. Dallek embraces the view that India’s motives for
intervention in East Pakistan were noble and that Nixon and Kissinger overreacted.
Pakistan’s civil war between east and west was escalating. Dallek records that Kissinger
returned from his visit to China with a “premonition of disaster” regarding South Asia,
expecting India to intervene by attacking Pakistan after the summer rains.38 Kissinger
“feared that China might then intervene on Pakistan’s behalf, which would move
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Moscow “to teach Peking a lesson.””39 Nixon and Kissinger believed that a war limited
to Pakistan and India would be “of limited consequence,” but feared that a broader
conflict would “jeopardize the China initiative and provoke…dangerous tensions with
Moscow.”40 Dallek understands Kissinger’s fear that war between India and Pakistan
could cause a superpower showdown, but does not see it as a legitimate.
When analyzing the South Asia Crisis, Dallek agrees with the assessment of
William Bundy, a former U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs. Bundy’s view was that “Nixon and Kissinger’s policy on the Indo-Pakistan war
was replete with error, misjudgment, emotionalism, and unnecessary risk taking.”41
Dallek believes Nixon’s highest priority during the crisis was protecting the 1972 summit
meetings in Peking and Moscow.42 Losing the summit meetings would destroy the Nixon
strategy of playing China and the Soviet Union off each other, and would be considered a
foreign policy failure that could jeopardize a second Nixon term in office as president.43
While Dallek is probably correct in his assessment of Nixon’s priorities, this
thesis takes his argument further. Nixon desired to protect détente during the South Asia
Crisis, but he risked détente in its entirety in order to maintain the Cold War balance of
power with the Soviet Union. The Vietnam War had created an impression of American
weakness that the Soviets sought to exploit in 1971, and Nixon was determined to shatter
any appearance of American weakness, even if it meant losing détente and the summit
meetings in Peking and Moscow. Nixon understood that if the Soviets felt they were
negotiating with a weakened America, the summit meeting in Moscow would be fruitless.
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Nixon had to negotiate from a position of strength for détente to succeed. His actions
during the South Asia Crisis were meant to reinforce the image of a strong America.
According to Dallek, during the South Asia Crisis the Soviet Union wanted to counter
what they believed to be “a U.S. anti-Soviet offensive” in “collaboration with China and
Pakistan.”44 This thesis argues that the Soviet Union not only desired to counter a
perceived U.S. offensive in Asia due to Kissinger’s détente visit with the Chinese, but the
Soviets desired to enable India to crush Pakistan completely. This would enable Moscow
to gain Soviet/Indian supremacy in South Asia should the U.S. and China prove to be
timid. Nixon and Kissinger held this view, and this essay argues that theirs was a valid
and credible interpretation of events.
Like Dallek, Dennis Kux in The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000:
Disenchanted Allies (2001), believed that Nixon and Kissinger took a simple regional
conflict and blew it into an international Cold War confrontation. Kux had served in the
State Department as a South Asia Specialist, and he had dealt with India and Pakistan for
more than two decades.45 Kux believed that Nixon and Kissinger were wrong in their
assessment of India’s ambitions. He said that “the White House’s flawed reading of
India’s intentions toward West Pakistan almost succeeded in transforming a regional war
into a great-power showdown.”46 According to Kux, “senior Pakistani officials...did not
share the Nixon-Kissinger view that India intended to crush West Pakistan after its
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victory in the East.”47 Kux explained that, “they believed that India’s ambitions were
limited to the establishment of Bangladesh and the humiliation of Pakistan.”48 Kux’s
assessment of the situation in South Asia in 1971 was based on his expertise and
experience in the region. His view remained the consensus of the majority during the
crisis and in its aftermath.
Westad and Suri explain the relation and relevance of the Third World to the
history of the Cold War. Dallek expands on Third World history during the Cold War by
giving a detailed account of the Nixon and Kissinger viewpoint during the South Asia
Crisis. Dallek and Kux agree that Nixon and Kissinger were wrong in their assessment of
the dangers posed by the South Asia Crisis. Dallek and Kux believe that India did not
plan to invade West Pakistan, and that the South Asia Crisis was purely a regional
conflict. Yet, the Chinese Premier, Chou En-lai, an Asian leader with a global reputation
for his political and diplomatic insights, agreed with Nixon and Kissinger’s assessment of
India’s intentions.49
Historical works containing a Cold War synthesis seldom include the South Asia
Crisis to any significant degree. This would be largely based on the prevalent opinion
that India had no ambitions beyond helping the Bengali people of East Pakistan to
establish their independence. If the South Asia Crisis was simply a regional conflict
between India and Pakistan, then it would carry few Cold War implications, and would
seldom be relevant to Cold War historians. The actual South Asia Crisis (war between
India and Pakistan) was also extremely short in its duration. It lasted only from
November 22, 1971 to December 16. The brevity of the conflict and the belief that it was
47
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only a regional war confined to South Asia accounts for its rare appearances in historical
writings on Cold War history. Yet, if the South Asia Crisis was actually a Cold War
confrontation between the Soviet Union and India on one side, with China, the U.S. and
Pakistan on the other, as Nixon and Kissinger believed, then it carried major Cold War
significance.
India claimed that it had no territorial ambitions as far as Pakistan was concerned
in the aftermath of the South Asia Crisis. Dallek and Kux take India’s claim at face value
and criticize Nixon and Kissinger for being too paranoid. The Indians were certainly
concerned for the Bengali people, and they needed to stem the flow of refugees for the
sake of India itself, but the records of Nixon and Kissinger indicate that this was not the
primary motivation for their actions. Nixon reasoned that with Soviet backing and the
opinion of the international community in its favor during the crisis, India would never
again have such an opportunity to defeat its long-standing enemy. He believed the
temptation for India to remove the threat of Pakistan once and for all was too great an
opportunity for India to ignore. Total Pakistani defeat would enable India to establish
long-term security for itself and it would become the preeminent country in South Asia.
Kissinger said his intelligence reports confirmed that India’s goal was to defeat all of
Pakistan, not just the eastern wing. Kissinger warned that India planned to move their
forces to the West once war in the East ended, and then smash Pakistan’s land and air
forces and annex Pakistan’s portion of a disputed land called Kashmir.50
One of the significant weaknesses of détente was that in order for it to be effective
the global balance of power had to be maintained. If one of the Cold War nations found
50
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that its power was diminished then the weakened state would have significantly less
leverage in détente negotiations. The United States could not allow itself to be seen as
occupying a weaker position than the Soviet Union regarding the global balance of
power. To do so would imply that détente was a political necessity that Nixon had
invented due to a weakened America. During the Cold War the Soviet Union would be
searching for indications of American weakness based on the debilitating consequences
of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and would exploit any perceived weakness to its own
advantage. As the South Asia Crisis emerged it was crucial for Nixon to project the
image of a powerful America, undiminished by Vietnam, if détente was to succeed.
Pakistan in 1971 became the stage on which the Soviet Union and the U.S. would
enter into yet another Cold War episode in the Third World which heralded global
disaster should push come to shove. Nixon said, “If India and the Soviet Union succeed
in destroying Pakistan as a military and political entity,” they will be encouraged “to use
the same tactics elsewhere.”51 Chinese involvement in the South Asia Crisis would be
limited, but failure by the U.S. to confront Soviet aggression in South Asia could
endanger all U.S. allies, particularly since the Vietnam War persisted. Nixon was forced
to take a tough stance in South Asia, and gambled that Soviet interests in détente would
temporarily curb their ambitions. Détente had caused the crisis and the crisis nearly
ended détente, but as the crisis reached its most crucial point, Nixon confronted the
Soviets and risked détente in order to insure the Cold War balance of power and the
survival of Pakistan. To the Soviet Union, the total defeat of Pakistan was considered a
lesser priority than potential gains with the Americans through détente negotiations. The
Soviets agreed to use their influence to restrain Indian ambition in order to protect their
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détente interests. Nixon correctly assessed the Indian/Soviet alliance as a Cold War
power play by the Soviet Union. While India focused only on its ancient bitterness
toward Pakistan during the war, the Soviet Union sought to humiliate the U.S. and China
on a global scale should they fail to assist Pakistan as it faced complete destruction as a
sovereign nation. Once the South Asia Crisis concluded, the United States rapidly moved
on to intervene in other Cold War episodes taking place in other parts of the Third World.
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CHAPTER II

DÉTENTE CAUSES THE SOUTH ASIA CRISIS

Nixon’s Failure to Adequately Address Atrocities by Pakistan
During Its Civil War Resulted in Intervention by India
It was Richard Nixon’s desire to begin détente and build diplomatic relations with
China that turned U.S. focus toward Pakistan. Nixon needed an intermediary to facilitate
an opening to China. Pakistan held an alliance with China that had been in place for
nearly a decade. This alliance had angered the administration of President Lyndon B.
Johnson, but provided a golden opportunity for Nixon to build his bridge to China as the
first step in détente. President Yahya Khan of Pakistan had relationships with the major
leaders of both the United States and China and could provide Nixon with the channel he
needed. Yahya was recruited by Nixon to fill this role after the U.S. President had
determined he was the best option. It was for this reason Nixon opened a new episode in
U.S. Pakistani relations during his first term in office.
As détente began, a catastrophic cyclone hit East Pakistan and caused a political
crisis which in turn triggered a civil war. Pakistan’s conflict over the secession of East
Pakistan escalated into civil war due to Yahya’s brutality against his own people as he
tried to suppress a political rebellion using violence. To establish détente in this early
stage Nixon carefully avoided any action that could jeopardize his relationship with

24

Yahya Khan. Nixon needed to remain on good terms with Yahya in spite of a U.S.
Congress that was firmly opposed to Yahya’s actions. The Pakistani President turned
international opinion against himself as his brutality became atrocity which sent a flood
of refugees into India. Nixon believed his public silence was necessary regarding the
internal affairs of Pakistan in order to protect détente, even as the wrath of the
international community descended upon the Yahya Khan.
America’s silence over Yahya’s actions implied collusion that sparked
international outrage. Nixon’s own diplomats in East Pakistan, unaware of Nixon’s
détente strategies, turned against him. Nixon desired to protect his detente initiative by
maintaining a neutral position, but the U.S. Congress and the U.S. news media favored
India. Nixon also could see the potential for a repeat of Vietnam in South Asia, which
reinforced his belief in neutrality. Kissinger said that if the U.S. “were to support the
insurgents in East Pakistan” it would turn West Pakistan against the United States.52
Nixon agreed and said, “If we get in the middle of that thing it would be a hell of a
mistake.”53 Nixon’s policy was that Pakistan could handle its own affairs without the
assistance of the international community. He did nothing of consequence to prevent the
brutality of Yahya Khan against his own people for two reasons: first he wanted to
protect détente, and second, he did not want another Vietnam.
The refugee situation became an unmanageable situation for India, and Indira
Gandhi, the Prime Minister of India, decided to covertly oppose the military forces of
Yahya Khan. When détente caused the Nixon White House to avoid its moral obligations
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to the brutalized Bengali people of East Pakistan, India began to mobilize in support of
the East Pakistani resistance. India aided the Bengali guerilla fighters politically and
militarily. Gandhi also harbored Bengali diplomats, and prevented the return of refugees
to Pakistan to keep them out of harm’s way. Gandhi then wrote to ask Nixon to use
American influence in order to pressure Yahya Khan to rein in his rampaging military,
but Nixon felt he could not do this. Nixon needed the help of Yahya Khan to begin
detente, and that took precedence. Nixon’s apparent indifference to Gandhi’s requests
encouraged India to intervene. Détente had caused Nixon’s silence, and Nixon’s silence
would trigger war between India and Pakistan.
This chapter will reveal that détente was responsible for the South Asia Crisis of
1971. Détente aggravated U.S. relations with India in two distinct ways that would lead
to war between Pakistan and India. First, Nixon’s secrecy on détente and his silence on
Yahya’s atrocities led to India’s increased determination to intervene on behalf of the
Bengali militia, and brought intense criticism by his own U.S. diplomats. Second, Nixon
hardened Indian resolve to intervene on behalf of the Bengali resistance using its own
military forces when he failed to respond adequately to Gandhi’s appeal. Nixon’s public
silence regarding Yahya’s atrocities implied U.S. collusion with Pakistan, which
prompted Indian collusion with the Bengali resistance. Détente motivated Nixon’s
actions, which motivated India’s responses, and caused the South Asia Crisis.
The U.S. did not understand the depth of the historical conflict between Pakistan
and India due to the episodic nature of American relations with Pakistan. The U.S. was
preoccupied by its view of communism as the great global threat, and never completely
understood that Pakistan feared India much more than it feared communism. The U.S.
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maintained a “get in and get out” policy in Pakistan during the Cold War. When Pakistan
played a role in American Cold War objectives, the U.S. became involved in Pakistan,
and then withdrew when those objectives were accomplished. The lack of understanding
regarding Pakistan’s historical bitterness toward India was caused by these Cold War
episodes. During the early years of the Nixon administration, Pakistan was viewed as a
potential ally against communist aggression. There was no serious recognition by the
U.S. that most Pakistani people considered the real security threat to be India.54 Failure
by the U.S. to develop a genuine desire to understand the region, and to assist Pakistan
politically in an ongoing manner, led to a shallow diplomatic understanding of the region.
Nixon would be blindsided by a war between Pakistan and India in 1971 that erupted
quickly and defied all diplomatic efforts to find a peaceful solution.
One cannot grasp the full scope of Pakistan’s political history without taking into
account the historical animosity between Pakistan and India. Pakistan and modern India
came into existence simultaneously in 1947 when the British gave governmental
authority back to the native people of South Asia. In its formative years “Pakistan was an
idea, not a state. The original idea of a Pakistani state revolved around creating a
homeland for Indian Muslims where they would not be dominated by the Indian Hindu
majority.”55 In reality, Pakistanis are Indian Muslims still focused on their ancient
conflict with Indian Hindus. This deep-rooted connection to India is the basis for an
understanding of Pakistan. Even the members of the lowest classes in Indian Hindu
culture “believed themselves part of a system superior to Muslims.”56 Such attitudes
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provoked resentment among the Muslims of Pakistan where India was concerned.57 The
British evacuation of India left a power vacuum in the country, and violence between
Pakistan’s Muslims and India’s Hindus developed immediately because there was no
longer a colonial adversary to unite them. This ongoing conflict caused President
Johnson to say “that what we did for many countries was repaid by their involving us in
their own ancient feuds.”58
The dispute over Kashmir has been a source of constant friction between India
and Pakistan as both have laid claim to possession. Kashmir is among the most desirable
of all lands in South Asia. The agreeable climate provides relief from the brutal summer
temperatures of the plains of northern India.59 The Vale of Kashmir provides a
comfortable and prosperous location, along with its lakes, and the Himalayan Mountains
as a picturesque backdrop.60 In 1947, Kashmir contained an 80% Muslim majority, but
was ruled by a Hindu maharajah.61 The ruler of Kashmir did not align himself with either
Pakistan or India during the time of their partition by the British,62 and even while he
lived, there was turmoil inside Kashmir related to alignment with India or Pakistan.
Arbitration within the United Nations took place in 1948, but its resolutions satisfied
neither India nor Pakistan. The region of Kashmir has been an unresolved source of
tension and conflict between the two countries ever since.
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Pakistan has a history of military rule since its origin in 1947. Civilian
governments in Pakistan have regularly experienced conflict during multi-party
democratic political campaigns. The depth of this conflict threatened the fragile security
of the country, and greatly worried military leaders. Commanding generals of the
Pakistan military would regularly seize power and declare martial law, and then establish
social order as they saw fit. This has happened four times in Pakistan’s modern history
under Ayub Khan (1958), Yahya Khan (1969)63, Zia-ul-Haq (1977), and Pervez
Musharraf (1999). These coups were often related to Pakistan’s fear of India, but were
just as often a mere pretext by the military to seize the reins of power. Experience had
taught Pakistan’s generals that civilian rule was too deeply divided and lacked the
precision and unity of a military structure. When internal strife caused by partisan
elections weakened the government, a military leader would seize power for himself in
the name of national security. The generals assured the people that civilian rule would
soon be reestablished once national security was assured, but such promises often proved
hollow.
Pakistan’s desire for U.S. armaments has been a central theme of U.S.-Pakistan
relations from the very beginning. Pakistan became a member of the Baghdad Pact of
1955 which later became known as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).64 This
evolved into a bilateral agreement of cooperation between the U.S., Turkey, Iran, and
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Pakistan in 1959.65 CENTO and its companion organization SEATO (Southeast Asia
Treaty Organization) guaranteed member nations the right to have access to U.S.
armaments in order to defend against communist encroachment by the Soviet Union or
China. Pakistan’s alliance with the U.S. had little to do with stopping the advance of
communism. When the U.S. offered weapons in exchange for Pakistan joining an
alliance to combat communism, Pakistan agreed because it wanted a stockpile of U.S.
weapons to insure its own security against India. It was most likely for this reason that
Pakistan agreed to join U.S. anti-communist alliances like CENTO and SEATO during
the Cold War. Membership meant that Pakistan became eligible for U.S. military aid. 66
Kissinger said this aid “was intended for use against Communist aggression, but was
suspected by India of having other more likely uses.”67
American involvement in Pakistan followed the episodic nature of U.S. Cold War
strategy around the globe. The U.S. became interested in Pakistan when it leased a U.S.
Air Force Base in Peshawar in July, 1959.68 The base was used for Cold War surveillance
operations.69 This motivated U.S. development projects including loans and grants for
irrigation, seaports, water and sewage, education, highways, railways, banks, food

65

“Editorial Note” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960 South and Southeast Asia, Volume
XV, Document 346, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1959-60v15/d346 (accessed
February 13, 2012).
66
Kissinger, White House Years, 846.
67
Ibid.
68
“Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to
Secretary of Defense McNamara,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968 Volume XXV, South
Asia, Document 491, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v25/d491 (accessed June
6, 2012).
69
“Letter From President Ayub to President Johnson,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968
Volume XXV, South Asia, Document 505, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus196468v25/d505 (accessed October 18, 2011).

30

storage, and commercial road vehicle projects.70 These investments in Pakistan’s future
were designed to produce healthy economic growth and to provide the needed capital for
individual business initiative.71 The investments were the result of American interest in
Peshawar. When the base closed in July 196972 after Pakistan terminated the lease, U.S.
interest in Pakistan faded. There existed no abiding loyalty or commitment toward
Pakistan as far as the U.S. was concerned once a Cold War episode concluded. American
governmental programs and expenditures often ended suddenly. This pattern of
American activity is clearly evident in U.S. relations with Pakistan.
The 1962 border war between China and India was a Cold War episode that
resulted in the U.S. supplying armaments to India to stop communist advance by the
Chinese. Pakistan protested this action, but Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B.
Johnson decided India was going to get what it needed militarily regardless of Pakistani
protests. American global Cold War objectives took priority over Pakistan’s regional
objectives. In the 1960s, verbal assurances to Pakistan of American protection in times
of conflict increasingly substituted for military hardware.73 The U.S. assured Pakistani
President Ayub Khan that it would check Indian aggression against Pakistan through the
use of an American aircraft carrier task force on standby in the Indian Ocean. In 1962,
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U.S./Pakistani relations suffered greatly because the U.S. assisted India militarily against
Chinese encroachment. American military aid to India in 1962 began the Pakistani
relationship with China. Ayub reached out to China for military aid to supplement
Pakistan’s forces against India because the U.S. provided India with military equipment
based on American Cold War objectives.
India and Pakistan went to war in September 1965, with both countries using U.S.
arms in the conflict. President Johnson “halted all arms shipments” to both countries.74
The arms embargo remained in effect for the remainder of the 1960s, and into the Nixon
era. In February 1966, the U.S. relaxed the ban to permit purchases of “non-lethal”
equipment.”75 America was protecting its economic investments in Pakistan by
providing limited military aid. The U.S. worried that Pakistan would divert money from
economic development and invest it in new military equipment at significantly higher
prices.76 When Nixon came to the White House in 1969, Pakistan was still scrambling
for military aid which the U.S. was hesitant to provide. India had superior military
capabilities compared to Pakistan.77 Much of Pakistan’s military equipment was growing
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obsolete by 1971 and they did not have the industrial capacity to manufacture their own
equipment as India did.78
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East and West Pakistan in 1970 showing the disputed region of Kashmir with India located in between the
eastern and western wings of Pakistan. Pakistan in 1970 consisted of these two wings, each separated
from the other by roughly 1,000 miles of hostile Indian territory. Pakistan had a difficult job governing the
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In order to prevent further military entanglements in foreign wars such as
Vietnam, Nixon formulated a policy for Asia known as the Nixon Doctrine during his
first year in office. It was established in order to align U.S. foreign policy with
America’s goal to withdraw from Vietnam. In July, 1969, President Nixon met with
78

Ibid., According to Lieutenant General R.H. Warren, India had been “gaining proficiency and capability
in the production of aircraft such as the domestically designed and produced HF-24 fighter jet.” Warren
also explained that India had “two assembly plants at which Mig-21s are assembled, mostly from U.S.S.R.
components.” In 1970 U.S. military assistance to Pakistan was “limited to training in the United States
and to foreign military sales of nonlethal end-items and spare parts.” General Warren testified before the
House Committee on Appropriations: “We do not sell any arms of a lethal nature to India or Pakistan, and
all sales of nonlethal items are screened on a case-by-case basis.”
79
Map of Pakistan, http://www.martinfrost.ws/htmlfiles/aug2007/part_india01.gif (accessed March 20,
2012).

33

reporters in Guam after he had witnessed the splashdown of the Apollo astronauts
following their return from the first landing on the moon. Perhaps due to the elation of an
American moon landing in the heart of the Cold War, Nixon spontaneously outlined a
doctrine that would define U.S. policy in Asia and reassure American allies. The Nixon
Doctrine was built on three primary points. The first was that the United States would
keep all its treaty commitments.80 The second point promised that the U.S. would
provide a shield if a nuclear power threatened the freedom of a nation allied with
America or of a nation whose survival the U.S. considered vital to U.S. security and that
of the region as a whole.81 Third, in cases involving other types of aggression the U.S.
promised to furnish military and economic assistance when requested and as appropriate.
Yet, the U.S. would “look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary
responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.”82 Vietnam had altered
American foreign policy in that it would no longer intervene militarily unless the
communist superpowers (Russia or China) attacked a U.S. ally directly.83 Nixon said,
“As far as our role is concerned, we must avoid the kind of policy that will make
countries in Asia so dependent upon us that we are dragged into conflicts such as the one
we have in Vietnam.”84 The Nixon Doctrine was designed to limit American
involvement in Asia, and it required Third World nations to take responsibility for the
manpower necessary for their own defense. In a summary prepared for the National
Security Council Staff in August 1971, as Nixon’s administration considered what to do
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in the event of hostilities between Pakistan and India, the phrase “short of providing U.S.
combat personnel”85 appears twice. This clearly suggested that the U.S. had no intention
of sending troops into another Asian conflict.
Détente flowed out of the Nixon Doctrine by necessity. The U.S. needed a
legitimate means of negotiation in place to limit its Third World conflicts and avoid
superpower entanglements. Diplomatic negotiation from a neutral position to defuse
hostilities was the primary U.S. objective. When Nixon initiated détente, one of his goals
was to end the Vietnam War, but by 1971 Nixon seemed to be looking past the Vietnam
War to larger Cold War opportunities that were presented through détente. Reelection
meant historic breakthroughs on nuclear armaments between the Soviets and the U.S. that
promised to assure Nixon a place in history. The Nixon Doctrine laid the diplomatic
foundation for détente by establishing that the U.S. desired to negotiate with other great
powers.
As Nixon came to office, political unrest was emerging in Pakistan. Pakistani
President Ayub Khan had resigned his office in March, 1969, and declared martial law in
Pakistan. He said that he did not want to preside over the destruction of his country.86
Ayub appointed General Yahya Khan as martial law administrator to reestablish order.
East Pakistan had been the stage for regular problems related to famine and poverty. In
October 1969, Yayha appealed to President Nixon for one million tons of wheat on an
emergency basis to stem the tide of a deteriorating food and price situation in East
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Pakistan.87 Yahya had already shipped a quarter-million tons of wheat and 350,000 tons
of rice from West to East Pakistan, but even that was insufficient.88 The problems of
geographical separation and chronic hunger challenges posed great difficulty for Yahya
Khan as he attempted to govern East Pakistan.
As part of Nixon’s détente strategy to remain in the good graces of Yahya Khan,
Nixon secured a one-time exception to the arms embargo imposed against Pakistan by the
U.S. Congress. In July of 1970 the Nixon administration notified Agha Hilaly, the
Ambassador from Pakistan, that it had approved a military arms sale to Pakistan.
Included in this sale were twelve tactical fighter aircraft (F-104Gs or F-5s), 300 armored
personnel carriers, four advanced design naval patrol anti-submarine aircraft, and seven
B-57 bombers (to replace those lost through attrition).89 When the ambassador asked
why no tanks were included in the sale, Kissinger replied that tanks could create a furor
in Congress that could “wreck the whole arrangement.”90 Pakistan wanted tanks from
the U.S., but this would increase the difficulty of selling the bill to Congress.91 Nixon
and Kissinger instead sought to have tanks transferred from Turkey to Pakistan.92 Nixon
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and Kissinger desired to provide military equipment to Pakistan because Yahya Khan
was a military leader rather than a civilian leader and his political support base was
military. For Yahya to secure his government, he had to present himself to the military as
a leader capable of acquiring the military equipment his country needed.
Nixon’s military aid package to Yahya Khan would secure their friendship and
strengthen Yahya’s hand with his political support base in Pakistan. Nixon’s military aid
package for Pakistan during a time of U.S. military embargo placed Nixon’s relationship
with Yahya on very solid ground. Nixon took full credit for the one-time exception so
that Yahya would know he had a personal debt to the American president.93 In October
of 1970, the same month that the military aid sale to Pakistan was approved, Nixon said
to Yahya, “It is essential that we open negotiations with China.”94 Yahya Khan was
happy to be of assistance as the mediator between Washington and Peking based on
America’s renewed interest in supplying military aid to Pakistan. Nixon’s military aid
package for Yahya Khan was designed to produce precisely his kind of enthusiasm from
the Pakistani President.
The exception to the U.S. military embargo against Pakistan was done by Nixon
for the sake of détente. Nixon’s arms package to Yahya Khan during a time of U.S.
embargo caused strain in U.S. relations with India even before the civil war began. This
would make peace negotiations significantly more difficult during the South Asia Crisis
that was soon to follow. Nixon’s military aid package to Pakistan prior to the outbreak of
Pakistan’s civil war shows that détente-related actions by the Nixon White House
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contributed to the South Asia Crisis. India could see only that the U.S. and Pakistan were
in collusion, but it did not understand why. India expected the worst. Nixon’s military
support for Pakistan grieved India and the U.S. ambassador to India, Kenneth Keating,
found it difficult to explain.95 The favoritism that the Nixon administration was showing
to Pakistan in order to secure détente was misunderstood by India. India had no
knowledge of Nixon’s desire to visit Peking using Yahya Khan to mediate. India
measured U.S. military sales to Pakistan as a threat to Indian security and it brought a
cooling in U.S./Indian relations. The deal caused tension between India and the United
States by causing suspicion as to U.S. intentions.
A month after Nixon’s military aid package for Pakistan was secured, a natural
disaster hit the Bengali people of East Pakistan that made all previous hardships appear
minimal. A massive cyclone struck the region on November 12-13, 1970. The New York
Times reported on November 16 that the cyclone and subsequent tidal wave may have
killed 200,000 people.96 More than one million people were said to be homeless, and
one-half million people needed relief.97 The New York Times added that 235,000 houses
had been destroyed and another 100,000 damaged; some 250,000 tons of rice crops had
been destroyed, followed by an outbreak of cholera and typhoid.98 On November 22, the
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Times modified its reports to say that the “cyclone may be the worst catastrophe of the
century,” with news that 500,000 persons may have perished.99
The cyclone disaster quickly evolved into a political crisis for the military regime
of Yahya Khan. Yahya had scheduled national elections for October 1970, but due to the
cyclone these elections were delayed until December. This turned out to be a tragic
political misstep for Yahya Khan. The national elections became a platform to criticize
Yahya’s incompetence during the cyclone crisis.100 He was depicted as slow in his
response and negligent when it came to the suffering of the people in East Pakistan. The
elections yielded a dramatic victory in the East for Mujibur Rahman and his political
organization known as the Awami League. Mujib Rahman and the Awami League put
forth a six-point program calling for “full provincial autonomy for East Pakistan.”
Rahman declared that East Pakistan “would have its own currency, keep its own separate
account for foreign exchange, raise its own taxes, set its own fiscal policy, and maintain
its own militia...”101 East and West Pakistan would be held together only by mutual
responsibilities to defense and foreign policy.102
President Yahya Khan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of the Pakistan People’s Party,
who had won significant votes in the West during the election, rejected Mujib’s demands
for East Pakistan saying they were “tantamount to secession.”103 As each side stiffened
their resolve, “a stalemate, or crisis, was imminent.”104 In March 1971, Mujib Rahman
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announced the takeover of the administration of East Pakistan.105 This action directly
confronted Yahya’s government while carefully avoiding a declaration of
independence.106 Yahya then flew to Dacca in East Pakistan to talk directly with Mujib
himself. When this achieved no results, Yahya had Mujib arrested for treason and
brought him back to West Pakistan to be imprisoned.
Yahya Khan was a military autocrat who would not tolerate the idea of political
autonomy in East Pakistan and the likely dismemberment of his country. He stubbornly
believed that he could intimidate East Pakistan’s people into submission using a force of
30,000-40,000 troops in the East violently brutalizing the population. Yahya’s brutality
in East Pakistan began in late March of 1971. Soon after, Yahya sent a letter to President
Nixon explaining that “the situation in East Pakistan is well under control and normal life
is being restored.”107 Yahya assured Nixon that he could handle the problems in East
Pakistan, but reminded the American President of India’s interference in the internal
affairs of Pakistan. He told Nixon that India had moved its military closer to the East
Pakistan border, and assured Nixon that negative reports from “outside sources” were
inaccurate, “especially the news media,” and were “designed to mislead world public
opinion.”108
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Nixon and Kissinger took some comfort in this report,109 until their own
diplomats began to speak out against them. On April 6, the U.S. Consul General in
Dacca, East Pakistan, Archer K. Blood, sent a statement of dissent signed by roughly
twenty of his colleagues to the U.S. Department of State. They expressed anger at the
U.S. government’s failure to denounce the suppression of democracy in East Pakistan,
and to denounce Yahya’s atrocities. Blood alleged that the U.S. failed to adequately to
protect its citizens and was “bending over backwards to placate the West Pakistan
dominated government and to lessen…negative international public relations impact
against them.”110 In this telegram, Blood accused the U.S. government of “moral
bankruptcy.”111 U.S. Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Kissinger were furious
that the State Department in East Pakistan had made public statements against the Nixon
White House. They believed that Blood’s letter would eventually reach Senator Edward
M. Kennedy, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Refugees, and the Democratic
Congress, which would embarrass the Nixon administration.112 Nixon transferred Archer
Blood as a result of the cable. Yet, Kissinger saw validity in Blood’s charges because
“the United States could not condone a brutal military repression” and “the strong-arm
tactics of the Pakistani military” under Yahya Khan.113 Kissinger explained that “the
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administration’s decision not to react publicly to the military repression in East Pakistan”
was “necessary to protect “our sole channel to China.””114 Nixon wanted to protect
détente by remaining silent. His failure to chastise Yahya for his actions confused many,
and outraged some.
One of the components in Nixon’s détente strategy was secrecy. There were very
few people aware that Nixon wanted to start diplomatic relations with the Chinese while
arms limitation talks were under way with the Soviets. Nixon pursued a larger Cold War
strategy than simply attempting to negotiate with the Soviets on nuclear armaments.
Nixon desired to be the key player in a global effort to bring all the Cold War
superpowers to the negotiating table. If successful, Nixon knew détente could also
provide the means to extricate the U.S. from the Vietnam War as well as provide his best
hope for reelection in 1972. The secrecy of the Nixon White House over détente caused
him to be misunderstood by many regarding his foreign policy moves in Pakistan. He
came under severe criticism for not using his influence to curb Yahya’s actions. As
Nixon prepared to initiate détente and utilize Pakistan as the intermediary to China, he
needed to guarantee the loyalty of Yahya Khan as his channel to China. Nixon realized
that any public statement he made against Yahya’s treatment of the Bengali people could
alienate him from the Pakistani President and jeopardize détente. In order to assure the
loyalty of the Pakistani President Nixon did not speak out at any point against Yahya’s
atrocities.
The U.S. believed an independent Bangladesh would come into existence as the
natural result of Pakistan’s political evolution regardless of Yahya’s efforts to prevent it.
Nixon and Kissinger saw no point getting involved in an internal Pakistani civil war in
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which both the United States and China believed the outcome was already assured. The
American Ambassador to Pakistan, Joseph S. Farland, explained in an April telegram that
the Awami League had mounted a resistance movement against Yahya’s forces. He said,
“events of the past two weeks have left such severe emotional scars that it (is) hard to
conceive that anything West Pakistan can now do will make most Bengalis willing
citizens of Pakistan. Bengali grievances (were) now etched in blood.”115 Farland was
convinced that Yahya might be able to crush his political opposition temporarily, but not
permanently.116
The effects of the cyclone and the ensuing civil war were so far-reaching that the
musician George Harrison, of Beatles fame, organized a concert in Madison Square
Garden called the Concert for Bangladesh. It was the first benefit concert of its kind, and
it “became the model for large scale, big name benefits that are common today.”117
When approached in 1971 by his friend, Indian musician Ravi Shankar, for help for flood
and war ravaged Bangladesh; Harrison decided he wanted to help.118 Harrison pulled
together an all-star lineup including the famous musicians Eric Clapton, Bob Dylan, Leon
Russell, and Billy Preston. On August first, the concert was held; it was recorded and
filmed and later released in movie theaters.119 Shankar later told Rolling Stone magazine,
“Within hours of the show, Bangladesh was known all over the world.”120 This global
exposure of events in Bangladesh brought Nixon’s policies in South Asia under even
115
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more scrutiny. Nixon had originally earmarked $2.5 million121 for refugee relief to
cyclone-ravaged East Pakistan. As the death toll mounted and the civil war began to
emerge, the U.S. committed $250 million in relief funds.122 Even this significant amount
of U.S. aid only touched the surface of the needs in East Pakistan.
The unforeseen consequence of Nixon’s silence was the Indian reaction. India
interpreted Nixon’s silence as agreement with Yahya’s policies on East Pakistan. This
encouraged India to step in and take a leadership role on behalf of the Bengali people.
One month after the Pakistan civil war began; India gave direct assistance to the Bengali
militia of East Pakistan. In April 1971, Henry Kissinger learned of a request by India to
provide unmarked small arms for the East Pakistani “freedom fighters” through
American CIA channels.123 Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman believed that he had
a secure channel for delivery, but did not think the operation would remain secret for
long.124 Assistant Secretary of State Joseph J. Sisco felt that the Indians were testing the
United States, and he noted: “It is one thing for the U.S. to close its eyes to reports of
clandestine Indian support for the East Pakistani resistance movement, but quite another
thing for the U.S. to collude with the Indians in this supply.”125 Kissinger said, “He felt
the President would never approve this project.”126
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Nixon’s strategy of protecting détente by refusing to criticize Pakistan led to an
escalation of the conflict between Pakistan and India. Nixon’s unwillingness to publicly
denounce Yahya’s military created an impression within India that the United States
colluded with Pakistan in the oppression of the Bengali people. Nixon’s apathy
encouraged India to support East Pakistan both militarily and politically. Pakistan’s
Ambassador to the United States, Agha Hilaly, told the U.S. Department of State in
April, 1971, that representatives of the “Provisional Government of Bangla Desh” might
approach them.127 Hilaly said that India had permitted the establishment of a Bangla
Desh government on its territory, and was providing financial support.128 Hilaly added
that Bengali representatives had no right to speak on behalf of Pakistan and had been
charged with treason.129 Pakistan was outraged that India interfered in what was an
internal affair within the borders of a sovereign country, but India could only see that
someone needed to stand up to Yahya for the sake of the Bengali refugees. Nixon has
chosen not to do this, so Gandhi believed that it was her responsibility to do so.
Nixon’s public silence on Yahya’s actions led to Indian support of East Pakistan’s
political and military goals. Once Gandhi had established this precedent, she appealed
directly to Nixon to use his influence with Pakistan to help prevent the endless flow of
Bengali refugees into India. Gandhi sent a letter to President Nixon on May 13, saying
that some three million refugees had fled East Pakistan to India; a number that grew at
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the rate of about 50,000 per day.130 The care of these refugees was “imposing an
enormous burden” on her country, said Gandhi, and “the regions which the refugees are
entering are over-crowded and politically the most sensitive.”131 She feared that these
areas could “very easily become explosive,” thereby constituting a “security risk” to
India “which no responsible government can allow to develop.”132 Gandhi asked Nixon
to “impress upon the rulers of Pakistan that they owe a duty towards their own citizens
whom they have treated so callously.”133 She hoped “that the power and prestige of the
United States will be used to persuade the military rulers of Pakistan to recognize that the
solution they have chosen for their problem in East Pakistan is unwise and untenable.”134
Gandhi explained that Yahya’s claims of restoring normalcy to East Pakistan could not
be taken seriously until Pakistan “is able to stop this daily flow of its citizens across the
border.”135
Gandhi’s letter was meant to suggest to Nixon that he needed to intervene by
restraining Yahya Khan, or India would take the fighting in East Pakistan to the next
level. The refugees were posing a political danger to India, and she meant that India
would be forced to act if Nixon did not use America’s influence to curb Yahya’s actions.
Her letter was an appeal to reason which also carried the veiled threat of war with
Pakistan. Two weeks later, in a slow response to Gandhi’s letter, Nixon replied that the
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U.S. was significantly involved in relief efforts for the Bengali refugees.136 He explained
that “in regard to the basic cause of the human suffering and dislocation…we have
chosen to work primarily through quiet diplomacy.”137 Nixon expressed concern for the
Bengali people, and assured Gandhi of his work behind the scenes to achieve peace, and
to create conditions where the refugees could “return to their homes.”138 Yet, he would
not say anything against Yahya’s actions publicly. The result was that Yahya’s military
never showed restraint, which proved that Nixon’s quiet diplomacy efforts were entirely
ineffective. Quiet diplomacy instead of direct confrontation toward Pakistan was a
strategy designed to protect détente. Nixon’s inadequate response to Gandhi’s letter
further encouraged India to intervene on behalf of the Bengali people, and led to war in
South Asia.
Nixon’s loyalty to Yahya Khan for the sake of détente would alienate India.
Indira Gandhi eventually reached a point where she no longer tried to negotiate with the
American President, but took matters into her own hands. India expected nothing from
China as far as restraining Pakistan because both China and Pakistan were considered
enemies of India. Yet, America was on friendly terms with India, and Gandhi expected
Nixon and Kissinger to use their influence to help curb the brutality of Yahya’s military.
When this did not happen, Gandhi actively supported the Bengali resistance. Even
though the Nixon White House had provided significant humanitarian aid to help with
displaced refugees, India would stiffen its resolve against the United States once Nixon
and Kissinger began to negotiate for peace. The indifference Nixon had communicated
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to Gandhi when she asked the American president to use his influence to restrain Yahya
Khan would be returned to Nixon when he asked the Indian Prime Minister to restrain her
own military. Both requests would be ignored.
Nixon had groomed Yahya to become his channel to China before and during the
Pakistan civil war. Nixon had developed a good deal of political influence with Yahya
Khan, but he did not use it to curb Yahya’s atrocities against his own people. Instead,
Nixon reserved his political capital with the Pakistani President solely for purposes
related to détente. The secret trip to China by Henry Kissinger in the summer of 1971
gave Yahya a sense of participation in a game of international intrigue that he greatly
enjoyed. Kissinger said to Chinese Premier, Chou En-Lai, that Yahya was “not very
intelligent” and “not a very good general,” but he was “a decent man” who was thrilled to
be part of Kissinger’s secret trip to China because “he loved secret missions” and he “was
beside himself with conspiratorial maneuvers.”139 Kissinger also said that Yahya’s
advice on how to deal with the Chinese Prime Minister turned out to be wrong, which
caused Chou En-lai to laugh when he heard of it.140 Yahya may not have been the ideal
channel to China, but he represented a nation that had built strong diplomatic ties with the
Chinese for nearly a decade, while maintaining good relations with the United States as
well. He was the best channel to China as Nixon began détente because both the U.S.
and China trusted him.
Yahya Khan had always believed he would remain in power in one form or
another as the civilian governmental factions of Pakistan fought with each other. He saw
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his military role as a sort of paternal watchman. He would allow the civilian
governments to do their best, but Yahya was confident it would inevitably become his job
to restore order should chaos envelope the country due to political battles between rival
parties. Kissinger observed that Yahya was confident he would “remain the arbiter of
Pakistan’s politics”141 regardless of the elections of civilian leaders, but the South Asia
Crisis would threaten Yahya Khan’s hold on power. Yahya’s attempts to stop the East
Pakistani insurrection using brute force would cause atrocities that outraged the world,
and East Pakistan’s refugees would become a continuous and ever-increasing flow into
India’s major urban areas.142 Nixon’s partnership with Yahya Khan regarding détente
was kept secret from the public, resulting in a negative interpretation of his actions where
the Bengali refugees were concerned. The Nixon White House was considered to be
calloused and indifferent. The U.S. Congress, Nixon’s own diplomats, and Indira Gandhi
were unaware of Nixon’s détente goals with China at the time. The American news
media, Congress, and the international community supported India who had borne the
burden of caring for the refugees that fled before Pakistan’s military. Yahya found his
military isolated in the east and the threat of war with India hanging over his head.
Nixon’s efforts to protect détente by taking no public action against Yahya’s
atrocities motivated India to a greater determination to intervene on behalf of the Bengali
people. What appeared to Gandhi as U.S. indifference toward the Bengali people caused
her to close her mind to peace negotiations. India would use the refugee problem as the
reason why it needed to intervene in Pakistan’s civil war, and few would deny that Indian
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intervention was a just cause. Nixon’s détente actions prior to and during the Pakistan
civil war increased anxiety among Indian leaders and hardened their resolve against
Pakistan. The Nixon administration had scheduled a secret trip to China by Henry
Kissinger on July 9-11, and Nixon refused to jeopardize his detente initiative by making
public statements against the actions of Yahya Khan’s military even when those actions
were egregious and brutal. This left India to become the defender of an oppressed and
abused Bengali people, and the support of the international community rested with India.
The cyclone in East Pakistan would be the primary cause of Pakistan’s civil war,
but the South Asia Crisis was caused by détente. The civil war was an internal affair
within the borders of a sovereign country, and Yahya Khan wanted it to stay that way.
The atrocities perpetrated by Yahya’s military upon his own people in East Pakistan,
combined with Nixon’s refusal to intervene or speak publicly against Yahya’s actions,
provoked India to intervene. Indian intervention defined the South Asia Crisis. With
world opinion behind it, India aided East Pakistani guerilla forces, and sought to establish
an independent government of Bangladesh to enable the Bengali people to escape the
brutality of Pakistan’s military. An aggressive and determined group of East Pakistani
guerilla fighters became known as the Mukti Bahini. India trained and equipped these
Bengali freedom fighters and then sent them back into East Pakistan to battle Yahya’s
forces and fight to obtain their independence.143 The breakdown in U.S./India relations
precipitated by Nixon’s détente objectives, encouraged Indira Gandhi to become
aggressively involved in the defense of the Bengali people. In so doing she launched the
potential for superpower hostilities based on U.S./Chinese alliances with Pakistan, and a
Soviet alliance with India. The South Asia Crisis was war between Pakistan and India
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combined with a Cold War confrontation between the U.S., China, and the Soviet Union
caused by détente.
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CHAPTER III

DÉTENTE THREATENED DURING THE SOUTH ASIA CRISIS

War between Pakistan and India Threatens to Become a
Cold War Confrontation between the Great Powers
that could End Détente
The South Asia Crisis had its roots in détente, and the South Asia Crisis
threatened to destroy détente. As Richard Nixon approached the diplomatic breakthrough
with China that defined his presidency, the South Asia Crisis was about to explode.
Nixon’s ability to restore diplomatic relations with China would be remembered as a
profound foreign relations triumph that established détente between the superpowers.
Yet, as Nixon’s historic foreign policies were beginning to blossom the U.S. Congress
took action against Pakistan that threatened to thwart Nixon’s partnership with Pakistan’s
President Yahya Khan. The U.S. Ambassador to India sided with India in the crisis, and
Indira Gandhi of India ignored peace initiatives by Nixon and Kissinger. Gandhi used
the Pakistani refugees as a tool to leverage her political goals by insisting that Yahya
Khan grant the Bengali people independence before she released the refugees to return to
East Pakistan. As Indira Gandhi asked her generals to design an Israeli-type lightening
strike into East Pakistan, Nixon found his détente initiative further complicated by
Yahya’s impulsiveness. Yahya made plans to have Mujibur Rahman tried for treason, a
politically inept move that could only complicate the crisis. When Yahya’s West
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Pakistan forces and East Pakistan’s militia (Mukti Bahini) went to war, Hindus were
targeted by the Muslim military of Pakistan. This greatly multiplied the number of
refugees fleeing into India. The Awami League leaders were arrested or killed because
East Pakistan wanted autonomy as the independent country of Bangladesh. India’s
support of the Bengali people escalated into Indian military intervention with forces
crossing into East Pakistan; an act of war against Yahya Khan.
As the Soviet Union sponsored Indian aggression against Pakistan by supplying
military arms, Nixon and Kissinger wondered if détente with the Russians was even
possible. A Soviet treaty with India on the eve of war with Pakistan while Washington
and Moscow were planning a summit meeting on arms reduction revealed that Soviet
ambition was relentless. The Soviet Union could leverage the South Asia Crisis to its
advantage in order to reveal American weakness. If the Americans refrained from
intervention on behalf of Pakistan in order to secure détente with the Soviets, then it
would increase the impression of American weakness. If America appeared to desire
peace at all costs then it would cause détente to fail because the U.S. would not be able to
negotiate with other nations from a position of strength; a situation the Soviets would
certainly exploit to their advantage.
Nixon and Kissinger were statesmen that were confident they could address the
challenging issues of the Cold War with poise and tact. Their memoirs present an image
of the two men as cool in a crisis and in control, but the South Asia Crisis of 1971 proved
that war between India and Pakistan, and the superpower alliances it involved, threatened
to unravel détente. Nixon and Kissinger found themselves reacting to urgent situations
more than they initiated events as the crisis unfolded. In private conversations Nixon and
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Kissinger raged against India for avoiding peace proposals and threatening war, thereby
endangering détente. The South Asia Crisis showed that even when the diplomatic
visionaries like Nixon and Kissinger played their roles to perfection, there was still much
left to fate.
China and Pakistan were allies, the U.S. had treaty obligations and firm alliances
to Pakistan, and India held a casual alliance with the Soviet Union because it desired to
maintain an unaligned status. After news of Kissinger’s secret trip to China in July of
1971 had been broadcast globally, he presented a veiled threat to India implying a
triangle alliance of the U.S., Pakistan, and China against India should India decide to
invade East Pakistan. Indira Gandhi became belligerent. A more secure alliance with the
Soviets would be sought by India immediately. Unaligned India solidly aligned itself
with the Soviet Union in August. Kissinger’s implication of Indian isolation was meant
to preserve the peace and protect détente by intimidating Indira Gandhi into a peaceful
attitude. Instead, it provided the Soviet Union with a significant opportunity to engage its
Cold War opponents using India as a proxy. The Soviets invested massive amounts of
military hardware into India as Gandhi prepared for war with Pakistan. Kissinger’s plan
to protect détente by intimidating Gandhi resulted in greatly endangering détente.
In truth, India had nothing to fear from Kissinger’s visit to China. Nixon had no
designs against India. He merely sought to take advantage of Pakistan’s alliance with
China in order to build détente. When it came to détente Nixon and Kissinger both
understood that without a China trip there would not be a Moscow trip.144 A U.S.
relationship with China would soften the Soviets when it came to détente and Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks because they would not want to risk a U.S./Chinese alliance
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against them. Without the leverage of a China trip Moscow may not be too interested in
American proposals. As the Pakistan civil war evolved into the South Asia Crisis the
Nixon administration, Pakistan, and China were on one side of the equation, while the
odd combination of India, the U.S. Congress, the U.S. media, the international
community, and eventually the Soviet Union were on the other.
The Soviet Union did not remain passive when political opportunities arose, and
as events unfolded the Soviets tested America’s resolve regarding obligations to its allies.
Henry Kissinger explained that the Soviet Union was known to throw a lighted match on
a powder keg if it would be favorable to its own interests.145 When the Russians backed
India in August 1971 a weakened Pakistan was confronted by an emboldened India.
Soviet support maximized the aggressiveness of India’s political and military machinery.
According to Kissinger, the Soviets seized a strategic opportunity and sought to humiliate
Pakistan which was a friend of both the U.S. and China.146 If either the U.S. or China
failed to come to the aid of Pakistan while having alliances firmly in place, it would
prove they were impotent.147 This would humiliate both the U.S. and China in the eyes
of the world for backing down in the face of Soviet-sponsored aggression as India
crushed Pakistan’s military. If the U.S. or China failed to assist Pakistan when
confronted by the superior forces of India it could put doubt in the hearts of all U.S. and
Chinese allies regarding the reliability and trustworthiness of these two superpowers. By
significantly increasing military support to India in the middle of the South Asia Crisis,
the Russians manipulated the crisis to their own advantage, and tested American resolve
regarding détente.
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The South Asia Crisis threatened détente due to the hawkish attitude of Indira
Gandhi as the crisis escalated. She had moved past any desire for a peaceful solution to
the plight of the Bengali people, and prepared for war. In addition, the Soviet Union
seized an opportunity to crush Pakistan and damage the prestige of both the U.S. and
Communist China. Nixon and Kissinger saw a threat not just to East Pakistan, but to all
of Pakistan. The South Asia Crisis threatened détente by forcing the U.S. into a defense
of Pakistan against a determined and aggressive Indian/Soviet alliance. Nixon and
Kissinger may have appeared to be confident statesmen during the crisis in their
memoirs, but the two men were actually consumed with trying to find solutions to
complicated problems without the promise of success. Some historians argue that Nixon
made the crisis into a global Cold War confrontation when it was actually just a regional
war. This chapter will give evidence that Nixon and Kissinger were correct in their
assessment that India intended to crush the entire nation of Pakistan once the East was
defeated. Rather than Nixon’s paranoia, it was Soviet opportunism that escalated the
South Asia Crisis into a global Cold War confrontation.
The developing crisis caused two major threats to détente when the U.S. Congress
went over Nixon’s head in its dealings with Pakistan, and the U.S. Ambassador to India
decided to defend India. These internal moves by members of Nixon’s own government
could have potentially jeopardized Nixon’s relationship with Yahya Khan. Nixon’s
people were working against him as world opinion was mounting against Yahya and
Pakistan. Nixon and Kissinger realized that using Yahya Khan as the sole diplomatic
channel to the Chinese government was hazardous. Nixon could be manipulated into
actions he wished to avoid in order to keep Yahya willing to mediate, and if Yahya were
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to fall from power the channel would close. It was therefore necessary for Kissinger to
insure that the U.S. and China developed additional channels of communication as soon
as possible in order to protect the détente initiative.
The Pakistani civil war caused the U.S. Congress to take action against Yahya
Khan. This threatened Nixon’s “one time” sale of military equipment to Pakistan
involving armored personnel carriers, modified patrol aircraft, F-104 fighter planes, and
B-57 bombers.148 This sale had occurred during peacetime in South Asia, but when
Yahya Khan began to move his troops into East Pakistan to suppress a national uprising,
the U.S. Congress suspended all military aid to Pakistan. The Democratic Congress did
not want to see West Pakistan using American military equipment against the East
Pakistani people. This Congressional move was done apart from White House
sponsorship as reports of abuses by Yahya’s forces increased. Senator Walter F.
Mondale of Minnesota said at the time, “There is something very wrong when guns,
tanks, and planes supplied by the United States are used against the very people they are
supposed to protect.”149 These weapons that Mondale mentioned were obsolete by
modern standards, as they had been supplied prior to 1965 under CENTO and SEATO.
When Congress received reports of West Pakistani atrocities, it wanted to remove
American weapons from the hands of Yahya Khan until the situation in East Pakistan had
been resolved.
Beyond Congressional restraints, Kenneth B. Keating, the U.S. Ambassador to
India during the first Nixon administration, had strong leanings toward India and was
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deeply sympathetic toward India’s mounting refugee crisis. In May 1971 the U.S.
Ambassador to Pakistan, Joseph Farland, pointed out to Henry Kissinger, that
“Ambassador Keating seems to have gone berserk…he has violated security and appears
determined to break Pakistan…he recently called in a New York Times reporter and,
(told) him the essence of Blood’s report.”150 Keating did not know that Kissinger and
Nixon had plans to visit China within the next year, nor did he understand Nixon’s
special relationship with Yahya Khan. On June 4, Nixon and Kissinger agreed “that
Keating had effectively become an advocate” for the Indian government.151 Nixon had
told Keating that the U.S. should not become involved in an internal Pakistani conflict,
but Nixon doubted that Keating would hold to that course.152 Keating’s opposition to
Pakistan complicated Nixon’s détente efforts.
If Yahya Khan felt that the U.S. was wavering in its commitment to Pakistan by
withholding military aid it had already been promised, and if he saw division developing
in Nixon’s government regarding Pakistan, it could cause him to hesitate in his
willingness to mediate between the U.S. and China. This created a potential threat to
détente. Keating’s actions were presenting a picture of a divided U.S. government, and
Nixon needed to address this problem so that Yahya would not waver in his commitment.
At a Washington meeting with Nixon and Kissinger on June 15, the President chided
Keating by asking him, “Where are your sandals?”153 Keating advocated for India and
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explained that the refugee influx from East Pakistan to India had reached five million,
and of that number about three million were settling in Calcutta.154 Keating explained
that Calcutta was about the size of New York, and the present refugee situation would
“be like dumping three million people into New York, except that Calcutta is in much
worse shape than New York.”155 Keating added that the latest he had heard was that the
refugee population in India increased by 150,000 each day, “because they’re killing the
Hindus” in East Pakistan.156 West Pakistan had also targeted the East Pakistan
intellectual leaders and had “outlawed the Awami League” and killed its leadership.157
Keating suggested taking $25 million out of U.S. aid for Pakistan and giving it to
India.158 Soon afterward, Keating left the meeting while Nixon and Kissinger continued
the conversation alone. Kissinger told Nixon that to take Pakistan’s aid and give it to
India “would be considered such an insult by Yahya that the whole deal would be off.”159
Kissinger “was referring to Pakistan’s role as intermediary in the contacts that were
developing with China.”160
Keating had made legitimate points regarding the intolerable actions of Yahya’s
military, and Nixon knew his recommendations were justified, but Nixon could not
follow Keating’s advice lest it destroy détente. Kissinger’s visit to China was only weeks
away and Nixon needed Yahya’s cooperation, which prevented him from speaking out
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against his actions. Nixon and Kissinger understood that Keating’s sympathies toward
India were reasonable, and that Pakistan was behaving in an increasingly villainous
manner. Yet, Nixon’s desire to protect détente caused him to maintain his silence. In
order to provide more political latitude, Kissinger promised that when he talked to the
Chinese the following month he would set up a different channel of communication
besides Yahya, so that the U.S. was not so vulnerable to having its diplomatic
communications with the Chinese collapse.161 After Henry Kissinger’s China visit in
July, 1971, he and the Chinese agreed to two new channels of communication apart from
Yahya Khan. The first of these would be in Paris. Kissinger was in Paris regularly to
negotiate with the North Vietnamese, so China arranged for Kissinger to use the Chinese
ambassador, Huang Chen, as a direct link to Peking. General Vernon A. Walters would
deliver messages from Kissinger and Nixon to Huang Chen in Paris, and they would in
turn be communicated to Peking.162 A second channel of communication was also
opened using Huang Hua, Permanent Representative of the People’s Republic of China to
the United Nations.163 Kissinger said that “Peking had agreed that we could use Huang
Hua in New York as a contact on U.N. matters or for emergency messages; the rest of our
business was to be conducted through Paris.”164 The new U.N. and Paris channels to
China helped protect détente by providing multiple ways for Washington and Peking to
communicate, and also insured that détente with China would continue if Yahya fell from
power.
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The international community believed that India had sufficient grounds to
intervene in East Pakistan because of the massive refugee influx it had experienced.
India had protected the Bengali people from Yahya’s military who had suppressed
democracy and murdered innocent people. India cared for millions of Pakistani refugees,
and aided the Mukti Bahini freedom fighters whom India and the international
community believed were involved in a just cause. By late August 1971 the refugee flow
from East Pakistan into India totaled seven million.165 This number would reach 10
million by November. Few believed India had any plans beyond helping Mujibur
Rahman and the Bengali people to establish a safe and independent homeland, then
allowing the refugees to return home.
The U.S. understood that tensions between India and Pakistan were rapidly
escalating as the summer of 1971 approached. In a memorandum to Henry Kissinger on
May 25, 1971 he was made aware that “there is strong and mounting public pressure in
India to take direct action against the Pakistanis over the refugee problem.”166 The
memorandum explained that “Mrs. Gandhi warned that Pakistan must provide “credible
guarantees” for the return and future safety of the refugees.”167 She also warned “that
unless the great powers take action to remedy the situation, India will be “constrained to
take all measures that might be necessary” to safeguard its own well-being.”168 India’s
resolve for direct military intervention inside Pakistan was growing. In an ominous
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picture of future developments the memo alleged that Prime Minister Gandhi had
“ordered her army to prepare a plan for a rapid take-over of East Pakistan and is said to
be particularly interested in an “Israeli-type lightning thrust.”169
Indira Gandhi formulated a military campaign similar to what Israel had done in
the Six-Day War of 1967. In June of 1967 Israel had preempted an attack by Egypt,
Syria, and Jordan by initiating a simultaneous lightning strike against enemy airbases,
catching enemy warplanes on their runways.170 The Israeli devastation of enemy air
power, 309 of 340 Egyptian aircraft destroyed, freed Israeli ground troops for
simultaneous attacks.171 Israeli warplanes were free to fly unhindered. Egypt and Syria
had no time to organize for a defensive war. The Egyptian troops were dug in so deep on
the Israeli border that those bypassed by Israeli forces could not aid those attacked.172 In
six days Israel had significantly increased the size of its territory and had seized large
amounts of Soviet-built military equipment from the enemy.173 Israel was actually
stronger after the war than it was prior to the war, which was an event almost
unprecedented in military history.174 The Six-Day War had given the Soviet Union a
bloody nose in the heart of the Cold War and established Israel as a credible and capable
military power. In the South Asia Crisis, Gandhi wanted to apply this same military
strategy against Pakistan. As the South Asia Crisis mounted, India planned a lightning
military thrust into East Pakistan to quickly control territory, seize enemy assets, and
immobilize enemy troops. If her plan worked, the war would be over before the rest of
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the world had time to fully understand what had taken place. Gandhi would provide the
military backing to enable the East Pakistan resistance fighters, the Mukti Bahini, to
successfully defeat Yahya’s forces and then establish their own independent country of
Bangladesh.
Yahya accused India of interfering in the sovereign affairs of Pakistan, hoping
that Nixon would use his influence with India to pressure Gandhi to cease. By the
summer of 1971 Yahya Khan insisted that India continually interfered in the internal
affairs of Pakistan and that India’s actions made the refugee problem worse. On June 28,
U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, Joseph Farland, said that Yahya thought “Mrs. Gandhi had
instigated the current problems through clandestine plotting with Mujib.”175 Yahya said
dealing with the refugee problem and getting them back to their homes would be much
easier “if India would stop giving support to armed resistance” in East Pakistan.176 A
distinct contradictory nature in India’s actions arose as the crisis intensified. India
repeatedly focused on the problem of the refugees as the reason for its involvement in
East Pakistan, but India’s support of the Mukti Bahini guerilla fighters sustained the flow
of refugees into India with constant warfare with Yahya’s troops in East Pakistan. India
“took no responsibility for the Bengali guerillas’ contribution to the chaos,” even when
“they were recruited on Indian soil, trained by Indian officers, equipped with Indian arms,
and supported by Indian artillery from the Indian side of the frontier.”177 India
persistently claimed the guerillas were not under their control.178 In a White House
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meeting with Nixon and Kissinger on July 28, Ambassador Joseph Farland said Yahya
had told him that his intelligence had pinpointed twenty-nine guerilla training camps in
India.179 The guerilla threat was growing by leaps and bounds,180 meaning that India’s
intervention could quickly lead to war. India held the refugees safely inside its borders,
reviewing military plans to invade, and training the Mukti Bahini freedom fighters.
Gandhi demanded a solution to the refugee crisis in India, but sustained it by her actions.
Indira Gandhi had determined that she needed to take charge of the chaotic
situation in East Pakistan. Her intention to intervene militarily on behalf of the Bengali
people increased and she stalled any serious peace negotiations. With the sympathies of
the international community behind her, Gandhi became emboldened to make demands
on behalf of the Bengali people and to place conditions on agreements. India trained and
equipped the Bengali militia. Gandhi held Pakistani refugees in India and would not
allow them to return to East Pakistan until Yahya could guarantee that the Bengali people
would become independent and that their safety could be guaranteed. Kissinger
suggested that because India is “hooking a refugee solution to an overall political
solution,” it implies that India is “using the refugees for political purposes.”181 Gandhi
determined to keep the refugees in India until immediate independence was declared for
Bangladesh, which India knew could not occur quickly. The refugees had become tied to
India’s political demands for Bangladesh. In a Washington meeting on November 12,
1971, Kissinger summarized the situation by saying, “India claims this is a Pakistani
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problem, but they are deliberately creating conditions which make it insoluble.”182
Kissinger and Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco, speculated that India actually
desired war. Kissinger argued that “India will never again get the Paks in such a weak
position.”183 A lightning war in East Pakistan, resulting in a quick Indian victory, could
also bring about the fall of West Pakistan. Kissinger explained that when Sisco started an
appeasement policy with India regarding its demands for Bangladesh, “India immediately
escalated their demands, so that they were not possibly fulfillable in the existing time
frame.”184 Kissinger and Sisco believed that India applied constant pressure to Yahya in
order to “suck Pakistan in militarily.”185 If India could trigger a military response by
Pakistan against India in West Pakistan, then Indian could blame Pakistan for escalating
the war and freely retaliate without being accused of initiating hostilities.
The greatest external threat to détente involved Indira Gandhi’s treaty with the
Soviets on the eve of war with Pakistan. In order to apply pressure to India so that
Gandhi would be more agreeable to peace negotiations, Kissinger issued a warning to the
Indian Ambassador to the U.S., Lakshmi Kant Jha. He explained that America would not
support India should China decide to attack his country during the South Asia Crisis.
Kissinger said “that the United States Government would consider any Chinese invasion
of India” that occurred as a result of Indian invasion of East Pakistan “as entirely
different from the Chinese invasion (of India) in 1962, and that the U.S. Government
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would provide no support to India, either military or political, in that event.”186 This
warning to India came in the same month as Kissinger’s visit to China. India saw itself
as the target of a U.S., Chinese, and Pakistani alliance against it. It meant that if India
wished to pursue its interests in East Pakistan, it would face both America and China as
allies of Pakistan. When Gandhi realized that Kissinger was implying a U.S./Chinese
partnership against India on the heels of Kissinger’s secret trip to Peking (July 9-11),
India acted accordingly in its own defense.
Rather than having the desired effect of pressuring India to negotiate for peace,
Kissinger’s warning backfired, and Gandhi immediately signed a treaty with the Soviet
Union. In New Delhi on August 9, 1971, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko
and Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh signed a “Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and
Cooperation”187 that would last for twenty years. The treaty was “an important Soviet
initiative to gain greater influence over the course of events in South Asia,” and it assured
India that the Soviet Union would provide significant support in the event of war.188 The
Russians immediately began to provide massive military aid to India, giving the Soviets a
significant voice in what was happening in East Pakistan. India could now pursue its
interests with the backing of an ally feared by both the U.S. and China. With the promise
of Soviet backing, India knew it could bring a permanent conclusion to the problem of
Pakistan. Soviet opportunism in South Asia on the heels of Kissinger’s China visit
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demonstrated that the Russians were confident they could handle a U.S./Chinese alliance
against them. Their backing of India escalated the South Asia Crisis and aggravated Cold
War tensions which seriously threatened the future of détente.
The South Asia Crisis had reached a point where the leaders of Pakistan and India
were taking actions that accelerated the likelihood of war rather than lessening it. In the
same month that the Soviets and Indians signed their treaty of friendship, Yahya Khan
decided that Mujibur Rahman of the Awami League would face charges of treason,
which implied a possible death sentence. Rahman was an elected representative of the
Awami League, with overwhelming support in East Pakistan. Yahya’s trial of Mujib
would aggravate an already volatile situation. Indira Gandhi appealed to the U.S. to use
its influence to help Yahya Khan “to take a realistic view” of the situation.189 Nixon
pointed out that since Ambassador Farland had a good personal relationship with Yahya,
he might suggest to Yahya that “not shooting Mujib”190 would be wise. Farland learned
that Yahya had decided that the trial would “be conducted with the greatest care,” and
“that because the charge carried the possibility of a death sentence,” it was Yahya’s plan
to accept a petition for mercy on Rahman’s behalf, if convicted, and then “sit on it for a
few months…until power could be turned over to a civilian government.”191 Once a
civilian government was in charge of Mujibur’s mercy plea, “there was little or no

189

“Letter From the Indian Ambassador (Jha) to President Nixon,” Foreign Relations of the United States,
1969-1976 Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971, Document 119,
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v11/d119 (accessed on January 23, 2012).
190
“Memorandum for the Record,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976 Volume XI, South
Asia Crisis, 1971, Document 121, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v11/d121
(accessed January 23, 2012).
191
“Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State,” Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1969-1976 Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971, Document 130,
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v11/d130 (accessed January 23, 2012).

67

possibility that Mujibur would be executed.”192 Farland said that Yahya had given the
matter “considerable thought,” to which Yahya replied, “I have, and you can stop
worrying because I am not going to execute the man even though he is a traitor.”193
Ambassador Farland spoke to Yahya at Nixon’s request, but Nixon was careful not to
speak of the matter himself to Yahya so that there could be no potential repercussions
that would affect détente.
Nixon and Kissinger might have better understood why Indira Gandhi opted for a
treaty with the Soviets and refused to negotiate for peace with Pakistan by taking a close
look at her family history. The South Asia Crisis demonstrated a generational cycle of
political retaliation between Pakistan and India. In 1964, Pakistan President Ayub Khan
had tried to pressure the United Nations to rule in Pakistan’s favor regarding the disputed
region of Kashmir. Kashmir had long been coveted by both Pakistan and India for its
natural beauty, lakes, and climate. This U.N. appeal by Ayub was done at a time when
India was politically weakened due to the fact that India’s Prime Minister, Jawaharlal
Nehru, was in failing health. Ayub took advantage of India’s political weakness and
attempted to seize Kashmir. This opportunistic tendency was not forgotten by Indira
Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru’s daughter, when she became Prime Minister of India (1966).
In 1971 Indira Gandhi had the opportunity to repay Pakistan for its political maneuvers to
gain Kashmir while her father, Jawaharlal Nehru, was near death. As Ayub Khan had
used India’s weakness to attempt the seizure of Kashmir for Pakistan, Gandhi later had
opportunity to exploit Yahya’s political weakness and could attempt to seize Kashmir for
India. Gandhi trained and equipped the East Pakistan freedom fighters during their 1971
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civil war against Yahya Khan. She also fought for them politically and harbored the
interim government of Bangladesh in India while Mujib Rahman was imprisoned.
Gandhi’s refusals to negotiate a peaceful solution when peace was within reach implied
Indian motives went beyond settling the issues of the Bengali people. Mrs. Gandhi took
advantage of Pakistan’s political weakness as Ayub Khan had done. This illustrates a
cycle of political retaliation based on ancient wounds between the two countries that
Nixon did not fully grasp and perhaps could not fully understand when he began his
détente initiative.
Nixon and Kissinger presented concrete peace proposals to Indira Gandhi to
protect détente and to avoid a confrontation between superpower nations, but she showed
no interest in their proposals when she visited the U.S. during her international tour in
early November. Based on intelligence reports Kissinger had received, he believed that
she would use her visit with the American President as a cover for an imminent attack on
Pakistan.194 In Washington on November 4, Nixon discussed with Gandhi the return of
refugees to Pakistan and a mutual withdrawal of military forces by India and Pakistan.
These possibilities were brushed aside by Indira Gandhi during her U.S. visit. Gandhi
offered no assurances that her country desired to avoid war. The following morning
Nixon and Kissinger privately expressed deep resentment toward Gandhi, and distrust of
India. Mrs. Gandhi knew that Yahya had agreed to meet with a representative of the
Awami League, who would be pre-approved by Mujibur Rahman, but she did not pay
much attention to this offer. Kissinger believed that “the Indians are bastards anyway.
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They are starting a war over there…”195 Mrs. “Gandhi did not respond to Nixon’s
proposal of the previous day to consider a withdrawal of forces from the borders of India
and Pakistan.”196 Troop withdrawal was not something that India was considering in
November. Nixon and Kissinger believed that Gandhi’s indifference toward their peace
proposals meant that she had determined to go to war with Pakistan, confirming their
suspicions, and endangering détente by creating Cold War tensions based on the South
Asian alliances.
Nixon believed that India was intent on invading West Pakistan once East
Pakistan was defeated. America was willing to work with Gandhi to establish an
independent Bangladesh because it was an obvious political evolution that was
unavoidable. An independent Bangladesh seemed inevitable, and the U.S. agreed to
accept this conclusion. This rendered war between India and Pakistan completely
unnecessary, but Indira Gandhi showed no interest in avoiding a war. To the contrary,
her actions indicated war was imminent. India had no need to send its armies into East
Pakistan because the international community had pledged to help India with the refugee
hardship. Legitimate peace negotiations were also available to all parties. When Gandhi
ignored opportunities to negotiate a peace, and made up her mind to invade East Pakistan,
Nixon was convinced that there were more sinister motives at work. Kissinger and
Nixon believed it was “India’s determination to use the crisis to establish its preeminence
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on the subcontinent.”197 President Nixon told his key leaders in July, 1971, that Keating
believed world opinion was on the side of the Indians.198 Nixon observed that this
assessment was probably correct, but added that the Indians are “a slippery, treacherous
people,” and he felt that the Indians “would like nothing better than to use this tragedy to
destroy Pakistan.”199 Nixon and Kissinger believed that the U.S. diplomatic efforts had
made war easily avoidable if India desired it, but India did not desire peace. India was
using the refugee situation as a pretext for war against Yahya in which it was certain to
come out the victor.
Nixon and Kissinger speculated that Indira Gandhi had made up her mind to
invade Pakistan before her arrival in Washington. India had assumed the moral high
ground in the eyes of the international community; therefore, any actions taken against
Pakistan by India would be free of reprimand. The Nixon administration concluded that
India planned to invade East Pakistan, establish an independent Bangladesh, move its
forces into West Pakistan to crush the Pakistan military, and then move to seize Kashmir
and further dismember Pakistan. Backed by the Soviets, India would make a strategic
move to cripple all of Pakistan in order to establish itself as the superior power in South
Asia. Indira Gandhi began to manipulate India’s responses in order to stall for time when
it came to finding peace with Pakistan. Gandhi’s demand for “credible guarantees” from
Pakistan on behalf of the refugees, and her escalation of demands gave the impression of
a strategy to avoid a ceasefire and keep all refugees inside India. This provided India
with time to position its military while training and fully equipping the Mukti Bahini.
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Part of Gandhi’s military plan involved the safety of Pakistani refugees in India, so she
could not allow the refugees to return to East Pakistan if war was imminent. It was
important for her to keep the refugees in India and out of harm’s way as she prepared for
war with Pakistan.
India’s belligerence, encouraged by the Soviets, threatened to unravel détente.
Should India invade East Pakistan and then threaten to invade West Pakistan as well, a
confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union would be unavoidable.
This confrontation had no predictable result for Nixon and it could destroy détente. The
attempts made by Nixon and Kissinger to defuse the South Asia Crisis up to this point
turned out to be ineffective. Nixon’s efforts to establish peace between India and
Pakistan to protect détente had failed. Nixon and Kissinger were merely reacting to
events rather than guiding their course. As statesmen, the two men found their skills
stretched to the limit, and much would still be left to chance.
The Soviet Union had given India the military backing to initiate war with
Pakistan and confront the potential of a U.S., Chinese, and Pakistani alliance against it.
On November 22, 1971, Pakistani radio broadcasts announced that India had launched an
all-out offensive against East Pakistan without a formal declaration of war.200 Pakistan
alleged that the attack included infantry, armor, and aircraft, while the Indians branded
these reports as “absolutely false.”201 Without a formal declaration of war from either
side it was difficult to know who had initiated hostilities. In a meeting of the Washington
Special Actions Group on November 23, Kissinger declared that India had launched an
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offensive in conjunction with the Mukti Bahini guerilla fighters, and provided air and
ground support for them to accomplish their objectives. Kissinger said in the meeting,
“There is no way guerillas could get tanks and aircraft and be operating in brigade
formation. We can play this charade only so long.”202 Kissinger was convinced that it
made no sense for India to claim that Pakistan had started the conflict. Pakistan had
twelve planes to India’s 200. Kissinger said it would be like the “Germans claiming they
were attacked by the Lithuanians.”203 The following day in a subsequent meeting with
the same group Kissinger asked, “Is there any doubt in the mind of anyone in this room
that the Indians have attacked with regular units across the Pakistan border?...Can we
possibly believe that these are guerillas attacking across hundreds of miles, with tanks
and aircraft, that this is an indigenous movement?”204 The lack of a formal declaration of
war kept Pakistan’s allies confused until India could seize East Pakistan and establish an
independent government in Bangladesh. President Yahya Khan by this time wanted “to
wash his hands of the situation” by proceeding with the election of a civilian leader
intending to turn “the situation over to (Zulfikar) Bhutto.”205
Nixon decided to “tilt” U.S. policy toward Pakistan in early December despite
pro-India sentiment in the U.S. Congress, the news media, and most of the U.S.
government bureaucracy. Nixon wanted to publicly express U.S. displeasure with India.
He wanted his press secretaries to do a background report on how India had refused to
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agree to any of the legitimate steps his administration had taken to avoid war in South
Asia. He was determined to cut off all aid to India. Nixon had previously stated, “If
there is a war, I will go on national television and ask Congress to cut off all aid to India.
They won’t get a dime.”206 Nixon’s tilt toward Pakistan was not apparent quickly enough
for the President in government press statements. In a meeting of the Washington
Special Actions Group on December 3, Kissinger told those in attendance, “I’ve been
catching unshirted hell every half-hour from the President who says we’re not tough
enough…He really doesn’t believe we’re carrying out his wishes. He wants to tilt toward
Pakistan, and he believes that every briefing or statement is going the other way.”207
Nixon also attempted to get military equipment for Pakistan from other parts of
the world because of Congressional restrictions on any U.S. military aid to Pakistan.
Nixon authorized Kissinger to negotiate with the Shah of Iran, with “the understanding
that any “back channel” military assistance provided to Pakistan by Iran would be offset
by comparable assistance provided to Iran by the United States.”208 It turned out “that in
light of the treaty of friendship signed by India and the Soviet Union,” the Shah of Iran
“could not send Iranian aircraft and pilots to Pakistan.”209 The Jordanians replied that
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they would “send four aircraft with Jordanian pilots immediately to Pakistan,” and up to
twenty-two planes once Jordan had a grasp of the operation.210 The Turks agreed to
provide six F-5s if the U.S. agreed.211 China would also send warplanes, but these
armaments could not change the final outcome of the war. According to General
Alexander Haig, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, India
and the Mukti Bahini had received massive amounts of Soviet equipment.212 In addition
to this support, India had its own military arms production capabilities, and Indian forces
outnumbered Pakistan in equipment and troops.
Both India and Pakistan increased military forces on their western borders as the
war between them progressed, triggering an expanded war. India had demonstrated an
aggressive intent by escalating its military presence on West Pakistan’s borders, so
Yahya decided to preempt instead of waiting for an attack in a location of India’s
choosing. On December 3, Pakistan launched airstrikes on Indian airbases inside India in
Kashmir and the Punjab region.213 Yahya was provoked into action by the presence of
India’s military already in East Pakistan, and the threatening buildup of India’s forces on
his western borders. Conflict took place beyond East Pakistan in the regions of Kashmir
and in West Pakistan based on what the U.S. would call the Indian method of “sucking
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the Pakistanis in”214 to a war. The constant goading of Pakistan by India provoked this
airstrike against Indian airbases. Nixon and Kissinger believed that the Indians would
use this as a justification to attack West Pakistan and Kashmir. Kissinger later confirmed
that he had a “whole file of intelligence reports which makes it unmistakably clear that
the Indian strategy was to knock over West Pakistan.”215 According to Kissinger, if India
succeeded in destroying Pakistan’s army, tanks, artillery, and air force, then “Pakistan
would be in their paws.”216 There would be nothing to prevent India from having its will
in Pakistan, and settling issues completely according to its own interests.
When Yahya attacked Indian airfields in Kashmir, India had the green light it
desired to take out West Pakistan’s oil reserves in Karachi. After Yahya’s airstrikes,
Gandhi immediately said “that Pakistan had launched a full-scale attack against India,”
and “that Pakistan’s Air Force had struck at six India airfields in Kashmir and…that
Pakistani artillery was shelling Indian positions…”217 India in turn felt justified in
attacking two West Pakistan oil company dumps in Karachi, producing a nasty fire that
the Pakistanis could not put out.218 Destroying Pakistan’s oil reserves would bring a
rapid conclusion to any military action by Yahya Khan. India did not attack Pakistan’s
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oil reserves in the West until Yahya had made the first move against India in a region
apart from East Pakistan. The Indian military strategy was to goad the Pakistanis into a
conflict and then hammer them to death militarily as a result. This enabled India to
maintain the support of the international community by alleging that Pakistan had started
hostilities.
Nixon’s disregard of Gandhi’s desire for him to confront the atrocities of Yahya
Khan had caused the South Asia Crisis. Gandhi held to her conviction that U.S. collusion
with Pakistan had triggered Indian intervention. As war progressed, Gandhi maintained
that India had acted morally, and expressed genuine surprise that Nixon could think that
India had caused the crisis. She wrote Nixon that “the world press, radio, and television
have faithfully recorded the story”219 of the struggling Bengali people. Gandhi said
regarding Nixon’s actions, “it was heartbreaking to find that while there was sympathy
for the poor refugees, the disease itself was ignored.”220 This referred to Nixon’s
willingness to provide aid for the Bengali refugees, but his refusal to confront Yahya
Khan and get him to restrain his military. Gandhi explained that “war could also have
been avoided if the power, influence and authority of…the United States had got Sheikh
Mujibur Rahman released.”221 She noted, “We are deeply hurt by the…insinuations that
it was we who have precipitated the crisis and have in any way thwarted the emergence
of solutions.”222
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Nixon replied to Gandhi’s letter immediately because he wanted the public record
to show that he had done a great deal to prevent war, but that Gandhi had resisted these
attempts. He said, “When we met in Washington you were assured of our intention to
continue to carry the main financial burden for care of the refugees.”223 Nixon also
mentioned he had discussed with her the various ways to begin talks between the
government representatives of Pakistan and Bangladesh, and that the government of
Pakistan was willing “to take the first step of military disengagement if…India would
reciprocate.”224 These proposals did not meet India’s requirements fully, but “they were
proposals that would have started the process of negotiations”225 and avoided war. Nixon
insisted that India had resisted these steps and determined instead to go to war. Gandhi’s
preconditions to peace involved the release of Mujibur Rahman and the immediate
independence of Bangladesh. Her demands left little room for negotiation. Gandhi had
made peace negotiations insoluble. The point of Nixon’s letter was to explain to Gandhi
that he felt she was to blame for the South Asia Crisis rather than the United States
because she believed she had the right to intervene in the affairs of a sovereign Pakistan.
In a move that only a few months earlier would have ruined Nixon’s hopes of
having Yahya act as the intermediary between the U.S. and China, Nixon and the United
States government hesitated to honor its treaty obligations to Pakistan in a time of war.
Pakistan was fighting for its very life against a superior Indian army with heavy Soviet
military support. The U.N. and Paris channels of communication to China that Kissinger
had set up during his visit enabled Nixon to remain aloof during the South Asia Crisis
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instead of being forced to intervene to secure détente’s only channel to China. Yet,
Nixon understood that the South Asia Crisis needed to be contained and ended as soon as
possible in order to protect détente. Continuation of the war by India threatened the
destruction of West Pakistan and a direct confrontation between the United States and the
Soviet Union. Such a confrontation could destroy all that Nixon had worked to obtain
regarding détente, SALT 1, and also the Moscow summit scheduled for the spring of
1972.
Diplomatic efforts were consistently made by the United States to end the South
Asia Crisis quickly, but Nixon received intense pressure from Pakistan to do more. As
the South Asia Crisis evolved into full scale war between Pakistan and India across their
Eastern and Western borders, Yahya Khan invoked Article I of the 1959 Pakistan-United
States Bilateral Agreement of Co-operation.226 In a telegram to President Nixon, Yahya
asked the U.S. to honor its treaty obligations “in keeping with the solemn agreements
signed with them, to meet this formidable challenge.”227 Yahya desired the U.S. to do for
Pakistan what it was doing for South Vietnam, but Nixon faced Congressional restraints
against helping Pakistan militarily and the Nixon doctrine made it clear that sending U.S.
military personnel to Pakistan was out of the question. Pakistan’s membership in
CENTO had promised U.S. military assistance against direct Russian or Chinese attack,
but it did not include American military backing in the case of an attack from India. With
his forces outnumbered, Yahya Khan pleaded with President Nixon “to issue a stern
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warning to Russia and India to stop aggression against Pakistan.”228 Yahya continued:
“There is also urgent need for material assistance from the United States of America,
directly or indirectly…”229 Nixon immediately replied to Yahya’s message, explaining
that the U.S. was involved in major diplomatic activities to end the crisis as soon as
possible, but there was no mention of military assistance for Pakistan in Nixon’s letter.230
The U.S. began engaging in legal maneuvers to avoid helping Pakistan militarily
when it was clear that the U.S. had moral obligations to Pakistan in its present situation.
The door to China had been opened at this point, so Nixon did not have to intervene in
the South Asia Crisis solely to preserve Yahya as his only channel to the Chinese. Some
argued that the United States had no legal obligation to Pakistan under CENTO in the
South Asia Crisis.231 Pakistan’s Major General Nawabzada Agha Mohammad Raza,
Pakistani Ambassador to the United States, called on Joseph Sisco to again request help
based on the 1959 bilateral treaty.232 Raza appealed to American willingness to help
Pakistan in its hour of need, and to avoid “specific treaty commitments which might be
subject to differing interpretations.”233 Raza said that, “We depend on you entirely.”234
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He understood the U.S. could not provide manpower, but that it could supply armaments,
“either directly or indirectly via third countries.”235 Raza presented an aide-memoire to
Sisco that stated: “Pakistan fully appreciates the political support given to her by
President Nixon and the administration, but because of deep and open Soviet
involvement, mere political support is not enough.”236
In spite of repeated appeals by Pakistan, Nixon and Kissinger could make no
promise to Yahya that the U.S. would intervene with military aid. Due to Congressional
restraints Nixon could not directly assist Pakistan militarily and establish a balance of
power in South Asia which would help insure peace in the region. In addition, Nixon
may have had no desire to become involved to that degree in order to protect détente by
not risking his diplomatic gains with the Russians. Nixon limited U.S. alliance
obligations to intense diplomatic efforts to end India’s war against Pakistan. Nixon did
have arrangements underway to provide military equipment for Pakistan through
intermediaries, but he was bound by law not to send American military aid to Pakistan.
George H.W. Bush, Permanent Representative to the United Nations (February 1971 January 1973), negotiated with Russian and Indian representatives to end hostilities.
Zulfikar Bhutto of Pakistan became Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime
Minister to Yahya Khan during the South Asia Crisis. Together Bush and Bhutto worked
in the United Nations Security Council to get an immediate cease-fire in East Pakistan,
and the withdrawal of Indian forces. The Russians used their veto in the U.N. to block
any actions taken against India, and China voted in favor of Pakistan on resolutions
related to the war with India.

235
236

Ibid.
Ibid.

81

Pakistan had no chance militarily against a Soviet-sponsored Indian assault.
Nixon realized that all of Pakistan could soon fall unless the U.S. or China intervened.
He understood that an ominous shadow loomed over détente due to Indian and Soviet
actions in South Asia. By December 5, Nixon and Kissinger saw that it was necessary to
take a stand of some kind to confront the Soviet Union, or the Russians would be
emboldened by the implication of American weakness in future Third World conflicts. In
a telephone conversation with the President, Kissinger remarked that, “This is going to be
a dress rehearsal for the Middle East in the spring.”237 If the U.S. acquiesced to the
Soviets as they armed India, and then allowed the Indians to rampage through Pakistan,
the Soviets would also sponsor similar activities in the Middle East soon afterward. If the
U.S. did not take a tough stand, West Pakistan would fall, and a similar attempt would be
made by the Soviets against Israel using a Soviet-sponsored country (Egypt and/or Syria)
in the Middle East.
Détente became threatened by the South Asia Crisis due to Gandhi’s belligerence
and the Soviet Union’s aggressiveness. In the beginning, Nixon’s silence on Yahya
Khan’s atrocities caused the rift between Nixon and Gandhi. Nixon’s channel to China
had been secured before India invaded East Pakistan in November, and the loss of Yahya
as a channel to the Chinese was no longer the threat to détente. The threat to détente
came through the crisis itself when India learned of Kissinger’s secret visit to China, and
Nixon’s planned visit to China the following year. Unaligned India became anxious
about a U.S. and China alliance supporting Pakistan, and India immediately aligned with
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the Russians. Gandhi’s plans to invade East Pakistan were already in place, but they
could not succeed unless she had a superpower ally that both the U.S. and China feared.
Détente was threatened by the Soviet/Indian alliance and its determination to bring
Pakistan to its knees. Nixon had to defend West Pakistan to maintain U.S. integrity and
to protect the global balance of power. Détente was endangered by a potential military
confrontation between the great nations of the Cold War era during the South Asia Crisis.
The Russians had gained a strategic advantage in which they could probe for weakness in
American resolve, and humiliate both the Americans and the Chinese if they allowed
Pakistan to fall.
Nixon and Kissinger were certain that India would invade West Pakistan. India
had goaded Pakistan into a war that Gandhi wanted. She had U.S. Congressional
restraints against Nixon helping Pakistan, the international community supported her, the
Soviets had given her massive assistance, her military was superior to Pakistan’s, and she
would have a significant portion of Yahya’s troops in custody once East Pakistan fell.
The international community would not reprimand her for crushing Yahya’s military all
across West Pakistan after it had committed atrocities upon the Bengali people. India
would appear justified and even heroic in destroying the army that had tried to destroy
the Bengali people. The historic bitterness between India and Pakistan made it
unreasonable to conclude that India would show any degree of mercy toward its ancient
enemy when it could permanently remove the threat of further war with Pakistan.
Gandhi possessed a political and military opportunity to crush its historic enemy that no
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Indian leader could ever hope for again.238 Kissinger’s intelligence reports confirmed
that Gandhi would not let the opportunity pass.
Nixon and Kissinger liked to think of themselves as foreign relations experts who
could solve Cold War problems, but the South Asia Crisis showed they were continually
on the verge of losing control of détente’s ultimate destiny. The crisis proved to be
anything but a regular situation that the two professional statesmen could handle with
poise and tact. Nixon and Kissinger were constantly thwarted by Gandhi’s refusal to
negotiate for peace and her support of the Bengali guerilla fighters. Kissinger’s warning
that Gandhi was on her own against China if she invaded Pakistan was supposed to be the
political move that would end the crisis, but it created a stubborn determination in India
to persist in its goals. India’s treaty with the Soviets put Nixon and his Assistant for
National Security Affairs on the defensive. The war between India and Pakistan created
Cold War tensions between the great nations, and could have been a way for the Soviets
to communicate to Nixon that Kissinger’s visit to China would not intimidate them.239
The aggressiveness of the Soviet Union during the South Asia Crisis threatened to end
détente before it could begin.
Nixon knew it was time to take action. He could remain silent no longer where
the Soviet Union was concerned. Failure to do so would imply significant American
weakness which would make the Soviets impossible to negotiate with. In order for
détente to be successful the balance of power between the great nations had to be
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maintained.240 Unless the U.S. could begin détente as a nuclear power with the
principled determination and courage of a great leader behind it, détente would fail.
Nixon would have to take a bold stand against the Soviet Union if he was to save détente
as the South Asia Crisis reached its most crucial point, even though his hands were tied
as he sought to assist Yahya Khan militarily. Nixon was already negotiating the SALT 1
treaty with the Soviet Union and plans for a spring summit in Moscow were on the table.
His presidential visit to China was only two months away. Soviet opportunism in South
Asia proved to be antagonistic and subversive as détente hung in the balance. The South
Asia Crisis would ultimately reveal to what lengths Nixon would go in order to protect
détente.241
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CHAPTER IV

DÉTENTE BRINGS AN END TO THE SOUTH ASIA CRISIS

Nixon Risks Détente and Warns the Soviet Union that
He Intends To Intervene on Behalf of Pakistan
Convinced that the Indian/Soviet objective was to defeat and cripple all of
Pakistan, the Nixon administration decided to take aggressive steps to bring about an
immediate ceasefire and maintain the territorial integrity of West Pakistan. Short of these
steps, the Soviets would not only humiliate China for failing to come to the aid of
Pakistan, but the U.S. would be humiliated as well for failing to help an ally militarily at
a time when its very existence was threatened. It was clear that East Pakistan would fall,
and the new nation of Bangladesh would result, but Nixon and Kissinger were convinced
that the U.S. had to protect West Pakistan from falling. Failure to do so would threaten
détente by demonstrating that Soviet ambition was beyond restraint, and it would damage
the integrity of U.S. alliances worldwide. Détente had given the U.S. a means by which
to work directly with the Soviet Union and China, but the South Asia Crisis placed Nixon
in a situation where he needed to negotiate détente during the heat of an escalating war.
The potential for mistrust and suspicion significantly increased in this wartime scenario,
and having to use a confrontational tone in his dealings with the Indians and the Soviets
would threaten to derail détente as well.
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The South Asia Crisis revealed the lengths to which Nixon would go in order to
protect détente and why. Beginning with an aide-memoire from the Kennedy
administration, Nixon sought to leverage Indian and Soviet restraint by warning of his
intention to enter the war on behalf of Pakistan. As Nixon warned the Russians of his
plans to intervene should India threaten to invade West Pakistan, he also requested China
to move some of its military forces to feint a joint U.S./Chinese intervention. This
created the problem of potentially escalating the crisis should the Soviets become defiant
and stiffen in their resolve. If the Soviets moved against China due to a Chinese move
against India, Nixon would have to step in and assist China in some way lest he sacrifice
Kissinger’s diplomatic gains. Any move the U.S. made against the Soviets to protect
détente with the Chinese, would threaten détente with the Soviets. As the South Asia
Crisis became a complicated Cold War contest, Nixon took a stand based on the principle
that American weakness was not the reason he desired détente.
Nixon’s actions during the South Asia Crisis proved his willingness to risk
détente. Gandhi had waged a successful lightening war against Pakistan similar to the
Israeli campaign of 1967, and Yahya’s East Pakistani forces surrendered quickly due to
overwhelming Indian/Soviet force. India and the Russians then needed to determine
whether to accept their gains in the eastern portion of Pakistan as sufficient, or commit to
war in West Pakistan. Nixon pressed the Soviets to rein in the Indian military in order to
preserve the integrity of West Pakistan under threat of U.S. intervention. Nixon moved
his naval forces toward the conflict and placed détente at risk. The Soviet power play
during the South Asia Crisis would determine if détente with the Soviets was possible.
Nixon had to maintain the balance of power during the Cold War or détente could not
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succeed. If Russian ambition caused the disintegration of Pakistan by India, and the U.S.
did not act, the Soviets would believe they could have détente and free rein in the Third
World as well. Nixon had to prove to the Russians that he would not abandon an ally for
the sake of détente. Peace at all costs was not an option because it signaled American
weakness to an opponent that considered force to be the key to political success.
Détente brought an end to the South Asia Crisis. Nixon believed he could corral
the Soviets using their own desire to protect their détente interests. As a result, Nixon
gambled with détente, SALT 1, and the 1972 summit meeting in Moscow. Nixon had to
risk détente based on principle, and communicate to the Russians that the U.S. would not
tolerate further Soviet ambition at Pakistan’s expense. If the Soviet Union viewed
détente as a political expedient caused by American weakness then it could not succeed.
Nixon would have to use the threat of force in order to remain a credible opponent and
protect American Cold War interests. Moscow hoped to save détente for a variety of
reasons. Soviet détente interests included grain sales from the U.S., avoiding a
U.S./Chinese alliance against it, negotiating troop levels in Europe, and limiting the
American nuclear arsenal.242 When Nixon made it clear that he would not tolerate Indian
and Soviet aggression for the sake of détente, the Soviet Union reined in the Indian
military and preserved the integrity of West Pakistan. The Russians ended the South
Asia Crisis in order to protect their interests in détente, and détente brought an end to the
South Asia Crisis.
As the South Asia Crisis expanded into West Pakistan and war in the east ended,
Nixon needed to deal directly with the Russians if he hoped to end hostilities. Nixon had
allowed India to arm the Mukti Bahini and train them for war in East Pakistan. He also
242
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had implied a degree of American weakness as India crossed Pakistan’s border to assist
in the defeat of Yahya’s forces while America watched. Nixon had warned India that
going to war with Pakistan would have serious consequences in U.S./Indian relations, but
the only bite in his words was the threat of suspending all U.S. aid to India. Kissinger
told the President, “What we are seeing here is a Soviet-Indian power play to humiliate
the Chinese and also somewhat us.”243 Kissinger added, “…our only hope in my
judgment…is to become very threatening to the Russians and tell them that if they are
going to participate in the dismemberment of another country, that will affect their whole
relationship to us.”244 Nixon needed a way to convince the Russians that he was a tough
and courageous leader, and that he would risk détente if necessary to get the Soviets to
rein in India. Threats to India would accomplish nothing unless the Soviets would
cooperate.
Nixon had to convince the Soviets that he would enter the war on behalf of
Pakistan if India did not show restraint. He devised a strategy based on an “aidememoire” from the years of the Kennedy administration. In November 1962, the U.S.
Ambassador to Pakistan, Walter P. McConaughy, had met with Ahub Khan, promising
U.S. assistance in the form of a telegram that McConaughy handed to Ayub.245 The aidmemoire read, “The government of the United States of America reaffirms its previous
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assurances to the Government of Pakistan that it will come to Pakistan’s assistance in the
event of aggression from India against Pakistan””246 At the time, the aide-memoire was
meant to divert concerns by Pakistan that the U.S. had supported India militarily in 1962
against the Chinese. This document became the instrument that Nixon used with the
Soviet Union in the South Asia Crisis in order to restrain their ambitions.
Nixon and Kissinger agreed to use the Kennedy pledge to warn the Soviets of a
clear U.S. obligation to aid Pakistan against Indian attack. On December 10, Kissinger
was scheduled to meet with Yuli M. Vorontsov, Minister of the Soviet Embassy in the
United States. Kissinger explained, “I’m going to show him the Kennedy
understanding,” and “I’m going to hand him a very tough note to Brezhnev and say this is
it now…let’s get a cease fire.”247 The U.S. would concede that India had won East
Pakistan, but if India and the Soviets made hostile moves against West Pakistan, Nixon
wanted the Soviets to understand the U.S. would be obligated to intervene. A letter from
Nixon to Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev explained that unless there was an
immediate cease fire in West Pakistan, the U.S. would assume that an act of aggression
was in progress against all of Pakistan, “a friendly country toward which we have
obligations.”248 Nixon reminded Brezhnev that because of the Soviet/Indian friendship
treaty the Soviets “have great influence” with the Indians, “and for whose actions you
must share responsibility.”249
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It was important for Kissinger to show a united U.S. government to convince the
Soviets that Nixon’s threat to intervene was legitimate. Kissinger’s emphasized to
Vorontsov the Kennedy promise to help Pakistan against India.250 He showed him the
treaty and said, “…now I hope you understand the significance of this. It isn’t just and
obligation. It will completely defuse the Democrats because they are not going to attack
their own President.”251 Kissinger meant that Congress would support Nixon because
Kennedy was a Democratic president and the Democrats in Congress would not oppose
alliance agreements by Kennedy. The message to Vorontsov was intended to imply that
all Congressional opposition to Nixon’s policies would disappear if Nixon deiced to
intervene. Kissinger warned Vorontsov that when President Nixon spoke of an
obligation to Pakistan “he was speaking of the Kennedy obligation.”252 Vorontsov’s
conversation with Kissinger would be communicated to Moscow immediately. Kissinger
told Nixon that after his meeting, “Vorontsov had needed no further proof of United
States resolve.”253 Kissinger later explained to Nixon that “When I showed Vorontsov
the Kennedy treaty they knew they were looking down the gun barrel.”254 Nixon asked,
“Did he react?”255 Kissinger replied, “Oh yeah.”256
Nixon believed that if the Indians and Soviets saw a combined military movement
by both the U.S. and the Chinese that suggested a defense of West Pakistan, it would
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restrain them enough to get a ceasefire. In conjunction with the Vorontsov conversation
Nixon requested that Kissinger ask the Chinese to move some forces.257 Nixon believed
it was important for the Chinese to move something militarily to secure a ceasefire. He
told Kissinger to have them do “some symbolic act” like moving a military division, or
something even simpler would be sufficient like moving some trucks or flying some
planes.258 Nixon also ordered a U.S. aircraft carrier task force to move into the Bay of
Bengal to frighten both India and the Soviets. It was Nixon’s desire to present the
likelihood of a U.S.-Chinese alliance moving against the Soviet Union if the Russians
and Indians did not agree to a ceasefire.
Nixon’s decision to gamble with détente revealed that he was willing to
jeopardize diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and sacrifice détente if necessary.
Both Nixon and Brezhnev wanted to keep détente intact, and both desired to follow
through on their plans for a Moscow summit in the spring of 1972, but Soviet actions in
the South Asia Crisis were unacceptable and jeopardized all détente plans. Nixon
observed that “If Brezhnev does not have the good judgment not to push us to the wall on
this miserable issue…we just may as well forget the summit” (SALT 1).259 Nixon and
Kissinger also discussed the fact that the Soviets had sent notes to Iran and Turkey and
other countries with veiled threats if they should help Pakistan.260 Nixon gambling with
détente in order to get tough with the Soviets showed that détente required the Soviets to
respect political boundaries. They could not trample on an American ally without
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endangering their own détente interests. By presenting the Kennedy aide-memoire,
Nixon himself had placed détente at risk, demonstrating to the Soviets that their
manipulation of the South Asia Crisis had negative consequences to Soviet interests. The
Russians could not expect to have détente with the U.S. and rampage through West
Pakistan at the same time.
Nixon believed that the Russians would not escalate the South Asian war to the
point where they might lose the opportunities presented to them by détente. As ceasefire
negotiations were underway Nixon communicated to Brezhnev on December 12 that
“time is of the essence to avoid consequences neither of us want.”261 It was clear that the
Indians and the Soviets would seize East Pakistan, but Nixon and Kissinger had
calculated that the Soviets would settle for the gains made in East Pakistan, and agree to a
ceasefire before invading West Pakistan in order to protect their interests in détente.
Kissinger told Nixon that he believed the Russians would not drive India to the extreme
in Pakistan, “because after all they already got 60% of the population of Pakistan.”262
Nixon said that he agreed.263 The American threat of military intervention on behalf of
Pakistan might not have been enough of a deterrent to the Soviets by itself, but potential
Soviet gains through détente with the Americans was not something the Soviets wanted
to sacrifice too quickly.
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As the Soviet Union pondered their response to Nixon’s presentation of the
Kennedy aide-memoire, a potential problem arose regarding the Chinese. Kissinger
feared that if the Chinese made an aggressive move toward India it could “stiffen the
Russians,” instead of causing them to back down.264 The Soviets could decide to take
aggressive action against China in defense of India. This would cause the stakes to rise
significantly by increasing tension between Cold War superpowers. When Kissinger
suggested to Huang Hua on December 10 that the Chinese consider military assistance
for Pakistan,265 there was the very real possibility he would get it. Then Alexander Haig
interrupted a meeting in the Oval Office between Nixon and Kissinger on December 12,
to announce that the Chinese wanted an urgent meeting.266 They believed that the
Chinese were going to move militarily on behalf of West Pakistan. Nixon’s dilemma was
how the U.S. would respond to a Soviet move against China. Haig was designated to
travel to New York to meet the Chinese as Nixon and Kissinger planned to leave for the
Azores for meetings with the French. All believed that the Chinese would do as
Kissinger had suggested, and feign a joint U.S./Chinese military move to protect West
Pakistan. It was too late to call off the Chinese for fear of Russian moves against China
without losing U.S. diplomatic gains with the Chinese, so Haig was instructed to tell the
Chinese that if the Soviets threatened China for moving against India the U.S. “would not
ignore Soviet intervention.”267
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Nixon believed that if the Chinese moved against India on behalf of Pakistan, it
would greatly increase the likelihood of Indian/Soviet restraint, but if the Soviets
hardened their resolve and moved against China militarily as a result then it posed serious
problems. Kissinger said to Nixon regarding the possibility of a Soviet move against
China, “I must warn you, Mr. President, if our bluff is called, we’ll be in trouble.”268 If
the U.S. backed down and refused to assist the Chinese against the Soviets, after China
had acted at U.S. request, it could ruin all diplomatic efforts begun with China by
Kissinger in July. If China’s involvement stiffened Soviet resolve and the U.S. reneged,
then détente with China would be over. Kissinger told Nixon and Haig, “If the Soviets
move against them (China) and then we don’t do anything, we’ll be finished.”269 The
Chinese would feel betrayed and the Soviets would be convinced the Americans were
weak. Kissinger added, “If the Russians get away with facing down the Chinese and if
the Indians get away with licking the Pakistanis…we may be looking down the gun
barrel.”270 Even if the United States were to do something symbolic like go on alert
militarily, or put a minimum of forces in, or give some bombing assistance to the
Chinese,271 warlike moves would still severely damage détente with the Soviet Union, or
end it altogether.
The urgent message from the Chinese was that “China was prepared to support
the United Nations procedure Kissinger had outlined in the December 10 meeting.”272
Haig’s promise to China of American support against the Soviets was never given
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because China never moved its forces to threaten India. The Soviets were given no
reason to move against China. Like the Americans, the Chinese promised to support
diplomatic actions in the United Nations on behalf of Pakistan, and would use their
influence to restrain the Indians and the Soviets. Kissinger had recommended to the
Chinese a joint U.N. strategy in which both nations would call for immediate cease fire
and withdrawal of forces from East Pakistan, but then would simply settle for an
immediate cease fire in order to save West Pakistan after the East was lost.273 Nixon
would not need to jeopardize détente with the Soviet Union based on his promise to assist
China.
The Soviet Union had made a significant investment in India’s war. They were
not going to agree to a ceasefire and walk away from a victory. The Russians delayed
their agreement to Nixon’s demand for a ceasefire based on the Kennedy aide-memoire
until the Indians had obtained the surrender of Yahya’s forces in East Pakistan and
secured their victory. An exchange of communications between Nixon and Brezhnev
which promised a quick Soviet response to Nixon’s demands for a ceasefire and
withdrawal was essentially a stalling tactic by the Soviets. These responses by the
Soviets were merely meant to buy time as the Indians pressed their victory to its
inevitable conclusion. The Soviet Union then used its influence with India to put an end
to the South Asia Crisis in order to protect Soviet interests in détente.
As the Indian military invaded East Pakistan to assist the Mukti Bahini, Yahya’s
military forces were severely outmatched and gathered around major cities such as Dacca
for defense and soon began to negotiate for cessation of hostilities. Kissinger told Nixon
on December 10 that “the war in the East has reached its final stages,” and “Indian forces
273
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are encircling Dacca and preparing the final assault” on Yahya’s forces.274 Kissinger
explained that the top Pakistani military official in Dacca had offered terms for a
ceasefire. Pakistani Lieutenant General Ameer Abdullah Khan Niazi, requested an
urgent meeting with the U.S. Consul General in Dacca, Herbert D. Spivack, on December
14.275 Niazi said that the bombing of his forces in Dacca “had convinced him that the
fighting must be stopped immediately to prevent further bloodshed...”276 Niazi offered
terms which, if met, would result in the immediate end of all Pakistani military operations
in East Pakistan.
The surrender of Niazi’s forces in East Pakistan signaled the turning point of the
war. It allowed Indira Gandhi to move her East Pakistan forces to West Pakistan and
continue her campaign if she desired. The crucial question after India and the Mukti
Bahini defeated Niazi would be the degree of Indian and Soviet ambition in West
Pakistan. Nixon knew that the South Asia Crisis could end, or the real war could begin
as India and the Soviets invaded West Pakistan and challenged its alliance with the U.S.
and China. Once the eastern wing of Pakistan had been defeated, and Yahya’s forces in
Dacca were in Indian custody, the Soviets used their influence with the Indian
government to prevent an assault on West Pakistan. The Soviets persuaded the Indians to
agree to a ceasefire. West Pakistan remained secure. Once Indian forces secured East
Pakistan and an independent Bangladesh was guaranteed, the South Asia Crisis ended as
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suddenly as it had begun. India did not pursue further military objectives in West
Pakistan.
When the war ended on December 16, 1971, Indira Gandhi announced “that the
Pakistani forces commanded by General Niazi had surrendered unconditionally…in
Dacca.”277 She proclaimed it “the free capital of a free country,” and “announced a cease
fire on the front between India and West Pakistan to take effect the following day.”278
Her government stated that “India had no territorial ambitions in the conflict.”279 At the
same time, India announced that it “expected there would be a “corresponding immediate
response” from Pakistan.”280 Pakistan accepted the ceasefire offer and the South Asia
Crisis was over.
The Soviets had humiliated China and the U.S. by the inability of Yahya Khan
and his superpower allies to prevent the fall and seizure of East Pakistan. The Russians
had successfully defeated Yahya’s forces in the eastern wing of his country by arming
India. The Soviets had also gained significant political credibility in the Third World as
an ally that could get the job done in wartime situations. On the other hand, Nixon’s
stand against Indian and Soviet aggression using the Kennedy pledge had brought the
desired result. His willingness to gamble with the future of détente had caused the
Russians to back down in order to protect their détente interests. To Nixon’s credit,
Kissinger mentioned that Chou En-lai, the Chinese Premier, would later tell Zulfikar Ali

277

“Editorial Note,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976 Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971,
Document 320, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v11/d320 (accessed February
18, 2012).
278
Ibid.
279
Ibid.
280
Ibid.

98

Bhutto of Pakistan that it was his judgment that U.S. actions during the South Asia Crisis
“had saved West Pakistan.”281
When it came to U.S. intervention in South Asia the Soviets may have understood
that Nixon was bluffing, but to call his bluff would be to sacrifice détente. The Russians
were held responsible for emboldening the Indians and aggravating Cold War tensions.
If India and its Soviet support base would have invaded West Pakistan once Yahya’s
armies in the east were defeated, it could have triggered a Cold War military engagement
between all three superpowers that would transcend South Asia. It would also have
killed détente and all potential Soviet gains. It was therefore in Soviet interests to accept
the gains they had already made, and to keep the summit plans intact for Nixon and
Brezhnev in 1972. Without remorse or apology, the Indians and Soviets ceased
aggressive actions against Pakistan. Soviet gains were accepted by the Americans, and
the Soviets did not hold resentment against Nixon for threatening to intervene on behalf
of Pakistan. Based on mutual self-interest, both sides understood that détente would
continue as planned in spite of the South Asia Crisis. As if the South Asia Crisis were
nothing more than a simple game of chess, Anatoly Dobrynin, Soviet ambassador to
Washington, “repeated an earlier suggestion that Kissinger make a secret visit to Moscow
so that Vietnam and other agenda items could be discussed with Brezhnev before the
summit.”282
In the aftermath of the South Asia Crisis, Kissinger convinced Nixon that it was
necessary to take steps in the U.N. to preserve the Cold War balance of power. If
Nixon’s threat to intervene militarily on behalf of Pakistan based on the Kennedy aide281
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memoire was not reinforced with an emotional display and public anger at India/Soviet
behavior it could make U.S. resolve appear unconvincing. After the Soviets backed
down and agreed to work toward an immediate ceasefire, Kissinger believed that
registering American outrage in a highly public format could give pause to the Soviets in
the future. He realized the U.S. needed to maintain a tough Cold War image to maintain
the balance of power. It was not enough for the U.S. to concede that India and the Soviet
Union had gained East Pakistan, without making public proclamations to oppose it. The
Nixon administration wanted to register its outrage at Indian and Soviet ambition.
Kissinger believed that “if the United States was to ease up on the pressure on India and
the Soviet Union “we’ve had it.””283 He recommended to Nixon that it was time “to turn
the screw another half turn.”284 Kissinger wanted the U.S. to make strong resolutions in
the United Nations to go on record as condemning India,285 but he told Nixon, “We are
doing this Mr. President with no cards whatsoever,”286 indicating that if the Soviets
became belligerent toward American criticism and pushed back, the U.S. would again be
in a difficult political position. Yet, Kissinger felt it was necessary to publicly register
American outrage in order to sway public opinion against the Indians and the Soviets to
curb future Soviet ambitions.
The Nixon administration took a tough stand on India in the United Nations,
demanding an immediate cease fire and withdrawal of Indian military forces,287 as well as
strongly condemning India’s actions in the crisis. The U.S. naval fleet would move
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toward Karachi in West Pakistan288 in order to establish that U.S. intervention was still a
possibility even after hostilities ended. By going on record in the U.N. as strongly
condemning India,289 the U.S. would maintain a tough posture with the hope that the
Soviets would be intimidated and therefore less likely to push their agenda too
aggressively in the coming months. The U.N. actions were primarily for the public
record because Nixon and Kissinger had already agreed to accept a simple ceasefire after
East Pakistan had been defeated. In a telegram from U.S. Ambassador Keating, he
“reported that rumors of possible U.S. involvement in the Indo-Pak war were circulating
in India. He asked for authorization to offer assurances that the United States did not
intend to support Pakistan with U.S. arms or equipment.”290 Kissinger replied, “Keating
is to give no such assurances.”291 This prohibition by Kissinger kept the Indians and the
Russians guessing as to U.S. intentions, and gave the U.S. the political initiative.
Henry Kissinger’s book White House Years presents a picture of Nixon and
Kissinger as taking a heroic stand against Soviet and Indian aggression. Yet, in a
telephone conversation on December 17, Kissinger said to Nixon, “We have come out of
this amazingly well and we scared the pants off the Russians.”292 Kissinger also
considered the fact that India did not completely devour Pakistan to be “an absolute

288

Ibid.
Ibid.
290
“Telegram from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the President’s
Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig),” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976
Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971, Document 302, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus196976v11/d302 (accessed approx. February 4, 2012).
291
Ibid.
292
“Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and His Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Kissinger),” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976 Volume XI, South Asia
Crisis, 1971, Document 324, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v11/d324 (accessed
February 18, 2012).
289

101

miracle.”293 The Nixon administration knew that it had relatively little control over the
outcome of the situation and had taken a bold gamble. Nixon’s private conversations
with Kissinger demonstrate surprise at the positive results of the South Asia Crisis where
American interests were concerned, and indicate the two men had little actual control
over the end result. Nixon’s hope that he could usher in the age of détente with his
diplomatic visits to Peking and Moscow were seriously challenged by the South Asia
Crisis. At every turn Nixon and Kissinger found themselves surrounded by unexpected
problems that threatened détente. Nixon’s détente goals could have crumbled at any
moment during the crisis if the Soviet Union pushed back on American resolve to probe
for signs of weakness that it could exploit.
The announcement by Indira Gandhi on December 16 of a ceasefire effective in
all parts of both India and Pakistan, assured the future of West Pakistan. Yet, Yahya’s
role as Pakistan’s leader was doubtful. In the immediate aftermath of the crisis there
were unanswered questions related to his fate, as well as what would become of Sheikh
Mujibur Rahman, still in prison in West Pakistan. The Pakistani soldiers under the
command of General Niazi became prisoners of war in India, with their futures to be
determined. The entire Indo/Pak war lasted from November 22, 1971, to December 16,
which was less than four weeks. The South Asia Crisis was a brief Cold War episode
that caught the attention of Nixon and Kissinger only for a short time, but during that
time the crisis held their full attention as they sought to save détente.
The episodic character of the Cold War meant that the U.S. did not linger long in
the various Third World regions where conflict took place. Once a crisis passed, as in
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Pakistan, the U.S. would become preoccupied by other issues and seldom consider the
region again politically to any significant degree. Yet, if the region became a Cold War
stage once again, as when Pakistani President Zia-ul-Haq assisted the U.S. in combating
communist advance during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, then the U.S.
would turn its attention there once more. Apart from these Cold War episodes, the U.S.
did not engage in significant foreign policy endeavors in the Third World unless there
were substantial economic resources to be gained such as oil. The United States had no
significant interest in Pakistan after the diplomatic bridge to China had been created and
the South Asia Crisis had passed. American diplomatic actions during the Cold War
followed a “get in and get out” strategy that was wholly dependent on where the greatest
threats of communist advance or activity existed in the world.
When Bhutto became the President of Pakistan in December 1971, he was
anxious about Pakistan’s weakened state, and presented an invitation to the U.S. that was
meant to help him find the security Pakistan needed. In March 1972, Pakistan offered the
U.S. an opportunity to utilize the seaports and land-based facilities of Pakistan for U.S.
military purposes.294 Pakistan remained deeply concerned over the intentions of the
Soviets and the Indians after the war, and Bhutto felt that a U.S. military presence inside
Pakistan “could bolster up its defenses in order to provide some credible deterrent.”295
To Bhutto’s disappointment, the U.S. had no political interest in Pakistan after the war
that could justify a military presence there. American interests overseas revolved around
a series of Cold War episodes such as the Vietnam War or Arab/Israeli conflicts in the
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Middle East. During the Cold War the U.S. had no interest in maintaining a military
presence in Pakistan strictly for Pakistan’s sake.
The Cold War interests of the U.S. would cause its leaders to focus attention on
Pakistan periodically, but when these episodes ended, the attention that America gave to
the nation of Pakistan ended as well. As the South Asia Crisis diminished, Nixon would
make plans for his historic visits to Peking and Moscow. Kissinger’s talents would be
redirected to concentrate more on other areas such as Vietnam peace negotiations in
Paris. Kissinger’s skills were needed elsewhere, and former Secretary of the Treasury,
John B. Connally, became a key Nixon liaison to South Asia. The U.S. would not take
significant notice of Pakistan again until Bhutto sought to arm his country against India
with nuclear weapons in the mid 1970s.
In post-crisis Pakistan, U.S. relations remained positive. The U.S. did not come
to Pakistan’s aid militarily when India attacked, but Pakistan knew that Nixon faced
Congressional restraints from doing so. Nixon and Kissinger had done everything
possible where the U.N. was concerned, and had gone so far as to assist Pakistan in
gaining military aircraft from third nations. Nixon’s tilt toward Pakistan was not a secret
when it came to the international arena, and Bhutto did not accuse Nixon of abandoning
or betraying Pakistan during the South Asia Crisis. Bhutto thanked Nixon for supporting
Pakistan throughout the war and condemning India’s actions.
As president of Pakistan, Bhutto was a civilian leader rather than a military
leader. Bhutto had been elected by a majority in West Pakistan during the December
1970 elections, and since East Pakistan no longer existed, Bhutto’s majority in the west
made him the legitimate civil authority of the country. He ended martial law and
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instituted a new constitution as his Pakistan People’s Party took the reins of power.
Pakistan had been under military rule for thirteen years, but under Bhutto the country
experienced its first democratically elected civilian leader since Ayub Khan came to
power in a military coup in 1958. During the Bhutto presidency U.S.-Pakistan relations
were cordial, but were often unstable due to Bhutto’s impulsive and unpredictable nature.
His western education gave him strong leanings toward democracy as a political structure
for Pakistan. Unlike Yahya, Bhutto was highly intelligent and a shrewd politician.
Bhutto was considered to be a political leftist.296 He was hot-tempered and pugnacious.
If he felt slighted, he could be vindictive. Bhutto had “denounced the Ayub Khan regime
as a dictatorship and was subsequently imprisoned”297 in 1968-69 before he became
president.
Addressing the issue of Mujibur Rahman and securing the release of Pakistan’s
prisoners of war after the South Asia Crisis fell to Bhutto. He and Mujib were
colleagues, and even though they were political opponents they were not enemies. On
January 3, 1972, Bhutto announced that Mujibur Rahman would be unconditionally
released from prison “without commitments or pre-conditions.”298 Bhutto said that Mujib
“came to me almost on his knees with tears in his eyes begging for his life and expressing
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his eternal gratitude for saving his life.”299 The kindness Bhutto showed Mujibur
Rahman after Yahya’s cruelty to him was a significant contrast, but Bhutto faced
criticism for not receiving solid commitments from Mujib before his release regarding the
93,000 Pakistani prisoners of war being held by India. Mujib not only hesitated to
release the Pakistani prisoners of war, he also threatened to hold war crimes trials for
some of them300 based on atrocities committed during the civil war.
It was Indira Gandhi that held the fate of Pakistan’s prisoners of war in her hands,
and once again Gandhi tied the release of Pakistani citizens under her control to a
political goal, just like she had done with the Bengali refugees. Gandhi said that “she
could not return”301 Pakistani “prisoners of war to augment Pakistan’s war potential until
she was satisfied as to Pakistan’s peaceful intentions.”302 More importantly, Pakistan was
required to acknowledge the sovereignty of Bangladesh as a precondition for the
repatriation of Pakistani prisoners of war. Bhutto said “it was wholly inappropriate for
India to link the question of the release of prisoners of war with other political issues,”303
and he was outraged that Mujib sought “to try some 1500 prisoners of war for alleged
“war crimes.””304 Pakistan prisoners of war remained captive in India until August 1973.
Potential war crimes trials were eventually reduced to only 195 of the captives taken by
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India’s forces when General Niazi had surrendered in Dacca.305 With the Indo-Pakistani
Agreement of August 28, 1973, all prisoners of war were released and repatriated to
Pakistan.306 Bhutto said that once Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh could reach agreement
on the fates of the 195 individuals being held for war crimes trials, then Pakistan would
formally recognize the country of Bangladesh and agree to diplomatic relations.307
Pakistan’s official recognition of Bangladesh was announced by Bhutto in February
1974.308 As democracy gained a foothold in Pakistan, America moved on to other Cold
War episodes.
Détente could only be effective if the global balance of power were maintained.
Nixon realized that Indian and Soviet ambition in South Asia could upset the balance of
power and give the Soviets an advantage in détente negotiations. Kissinger understood
that if America did not maintain a hard line against Soviet military support for India as it
invaded East Pakistan, then it was highly likely the Soviets would repeat their actions
elsewhere. Détente had no ability to modify the global ambition of the Soviet Union. It
could produce no change of attitude or ideology among Cold War adversaries.
Throughout the remainder of Nixon’s time in office the Soviet pattern of supplying
massive armaments to Third World countries that were at war with American allies
continued. Soviet backing of a North Vietnamese invasion into South Vietnam in 1972
and Soviet backing of Egypt and Syria against Israel in the Yom Kippur War of 1973
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further demonstrated the Cold War ambitions of the Soviet Union. Nixon later explained,
“I have never said that the Soviets are “good guys.” What I have always said is that we
should not enter into unnecessary confrontations with them.”309 Nixon went on to say
that “the Soviet Union will always act in its own self-interest; and so will the United
States. Détente cannot change that. All we can hope from détente is that it will minimize
confrontation in marginal areas and provide…alternative possibilities in the major
ones.”310 The Soviet Union believed it had the ideological solution to the needs of the
world. In the Marxist/Leninist mind this often involved the necessity of war rather than
pursuing peace.
Détente brought an end to the South Asia Crisis because the Soviet Union
believed détente served Soviet interests more than the dismantling of Pakistan. The
Soviet Union remained content with the gains made in the East Pakistan portion of the
war, and discouraged India from pursuing further ambitions in West Pakistan. Nixon
demanded that the Russians use their influence to rein in the Indian military to protect the
sovereignty of West Pakistan, and the Soviets consented based on their desire to preserve
their potential gains through détente. Were it not for détente and the benefits the Soviets
hoped to receive as a result of their participation and cooperation, the South Asia Crisis
could have continued until Pakistan was destroyed. India’s military stopped short of
these intentions due to the insistence of the Soviet Union.
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CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The Episodic Nature of U.S. Relations
with Pakistan Continues
The South Asia Crisis demonstrated how the U.S. approached the Third World in
general during the Cold War. The crisis illustrated the episodic nature of U.S.
relationships with developing countries. American Cold War policy in developing
countries was to pursue and prevent the threat of global communist expansion. The U.S.,
the Soviet Union, and Communist China aligned themselves with the developing
countries of the Third World in order to promote their respective political ideologies.
When these developing countries went to war with one another, the various superpowers
would back them. In this way the Third World armies would fight the Cold War battles
of the great nations as proxies. America followed potential communist threats around the
globe incorporating a get-in and get-out strategy of assisting its allies in the Third World.
These Third World battlefields frequently changed location as nations like the U.S. and
the Soviet Union engaged each other in various locations in an episodic fashion. When a
Soviet or Chinese ally threatened a U.S. ally, the U.S. got in quickly and aggressively,
but would then move on suddenly and completely to confront new Cold War challenges
once the threat had been addressed.
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The South Asia Crisis is a case study of U.S. Cold War relations with the Third
World. Nixon became involved in Pakistan in order to secure a diplomatic opening to
China to begin his détente initiative. The U.S. had no significant interest in Pakistan
apart from American Cold War objectives in the region. Nixon supported a Pakistani
government that had committed atrocities against its own people during a sudden and
unexpected civil war. To protect détente he maintained a public silence where Pakistan
was concerned. India and the Soviet Union intervened, leading to the South Asia Crisis
which threatened détente on various levels. When Soviet Cold War ambitions became
too blatant in South Asia, Nixon confronted the Soviets and threatened U.S. intervention
on behalf of Pakistan. Nixon and Kissinger did what was necessary to regain control of
the situation to preserve the Cold War balance of power. Nixon’s reasons for U.S.
involvement in Pakistan were to secure diplomatic relations with China and minimize
Soviet advances in South Asia. His intervention during the crisis was done for the sake
of U.S. Cold War interests, and not for Pakistan’s own sake. Once U.S. Cold War
objectives in Pakistan had been accomplished, the U.S. diplomatically and politically
vacated the country, moving on to other regions of the world that were threatened by
communism.
The episodic nature of U.S. relations with Pakistan is a pattern America has
followed since the South Asia Crisis, and presents a picture of U.S. Cold War relations
with developing countries that continues today. After the South Asia Crisis, the U.S.
again became involved in Pakistan during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.
This episode caused a close U.S. relationship to develop with Pakistani President Zia ulHaq during the presidency of Ronald Reagan. After the Soviet withdrawal from
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Afghanistan, the U.S. quickly departed the region. The modern War on Terror has also
produced a new episode in U.S. relations with Pakistan as President George W. Bush
recruited Pakistani President Pervez Musharaff to cooperate in the American battle
against the Taliban and Al Qaeda.
Maintaining the political stability of Pakistan during an episode of involvement is
a primary concern to the United States. Political stability in Pakistan often comes in the
form of an autocratic dictator backed by the country’s military. When a military dictator
can manage to keep Pakistan politically stable, the U.S. will work with him in pursuit of
American interests because he is the most reliable path to accomplishing American
objectives. This was demonstrated in the way that Nixon worked with the military
regime of Yahya Khan during the South Asia Crisis, overlooking its flaws and propping
up its authority. It is also evident in the American alliance with General Zia ul-Haq
during the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, and with General Pervez Musharaff during the
modern War on Terror.
Before the end of the 1970s both Mujibur Rahman and Zulfikar Bhutto were
murdered by military factions opposed to their governments. Mujib would become the
victim of a violent assassination in Bangladesh as he and a large number of his family
members were slain in August, 1975. Allegedly, six disgruntled majors along with three
hundred men under their command acted unilaterally and ended Mujib’s regime.311
Serious doubts arouse as to the unilateral nature of the assassination when the new
leadership took power soon after. Two years later, Zulfikar Bhutto would be arrested and
imprisoned by his senior military commander, General Zia ul-Haq, in July, 1977.
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Zulfikar’s 24-year-old daughter at the time, Benazir, remembered her mother waking the
family and calling out, “The army’s taken over, the army’s taken over!”312 Zulfikar’s son
was ready to resist, but his father warned him, “Never resist a military coup. We must
give them no pretext to justify our murders.”313 Benazir later wrote that she “shuddered
to think of how Mujib and most of his family had been assassinated in their Dacca home
two years before.”314
Benazir Bhutto later wrote that, “General Zia is often identified as the person
most responsible for turning Pakistan into a global center for political Islam,” and he
“attained power as a result of a mosque-military alliance.”315 The Pakistan People’s
Party under Zulfikar Bhutto carried the slogan of “Bread, Clothing, and Shelter”316 for
all. Zia allied himself with the Islamists, and in order to court their favor, created the
motto of “Faith, Piety, and Jihad.”317 Zia later charged Zulfikar Bhutto “with a baseless
crime, and, in the face of worldwide outrage, executed him on April 4, 1979, in what
leading jurists referred to as a judicial murder.”318 This would be the American
equivalent of General Douglas MacArthur seizing the White House with his forces and
ordering President Harry S. Truman arrested, tried, and then executed for alleged crimes.
The assassination of Mujibur Rahman in Bangladesh, and the death of Zulfikar Bhutto in
Pakistan four years later, marked “the end of an entire era of hopes and illusions
surrounding the prospects for social democracy in conditions of severe backwardness and
312
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underdevelopment.”319 By the end of the 1970s the civilian governments of both Bhutto
and Rahman had ended. Pakistan under Zia then experienced an autocratic period of
military rule.
The true power in Pakistan has always been the military, and it remains so today.
Under the Zia regime and using U.S. dollars he reinvented the intelligence agency called
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The ISI “is Pakistan’s military equivalent of the Central
Intelligence Agency” (CIA).320 According to the New York Times, American officials
believe that “the ISI has sometimes functioned as a shadow government” using its ties “to
drug dealers and Islamic extremists to stir up trouble not only in Pakistan but also in
Afghanistan.”321 The ISI “helped bring the Taliban to power in Afghanistan in the 1990s,
and many American officials suspect that those ties still are at work.”322 After the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Zia partnered with the U.S. to combat the Soviets. The
U.S. supported the dictatorship of Zia because he had an organized military that could
provide the necessary structure in the resistance movement against the Soviet Union.
America ignored the fact that he had come to power by murdering a democratically
elected civilian President.
Concentrating solely on its Cold War objectives, the U.S. abundantly armed the
anti-Soviet fighters in both Afghanistan and Pakistan through the Zia regime. Known as
the mujahedeen, these Pakistani and Afghan freedom fighters aggressively opposed the
Soviet military and eventually became the Islamist radicals of the 1990s. Osama Bin
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Laden was numbered among them as a chieftain. American support for the mujahedeen
in the Afghan war with the Soviet Union in 1979 became the next “get in and get out”
episode in U.S.-Pakistani relations. When the Soviet Union withdrew its forces from
Afghanistan in 1989, the U.S. did what it had done after the 1971 South Asia Crisis;
America pulled out of Afghanistan and Pakistan completely. Benazir Bhutto, a former
Pakistani Prime Minister, explained that “the West had abandoned three million Afghan
refugees and stopped all assistance to them after the Soviets left.”323 It is important to
note that many of these Afghan refugees migrated between Afghanistan and Pakistan, not
recognizing the border between the two countries. She also said, “By pulling out of
Afghanistan in the early 1990s, the United States lost all control over, influence on, and
intelligence about the radical groups it had financed. Suddenly, there were thousands of
U.S.-trained…radical fighters left out in the cold.”324 The pattern of America “getting in
and then getting out” once the crisis had passed is a pattern of U.S. behavior seen
throughout the Cold War in various places around the world. General Zia was killed in
an airplane explosion in August, 1988, paving the way for the Bhutto legacy of
democracy to return to Pakistan through Zulfikar’s daughter, Benazir. She would be
elected twice as Prime Minister of Pakistan.
Thirty years after the South Asia Crisis, in 2001, the War on Terror replaced the
Cold War, and once more Pakistan became central to U.S. foreign policy in the battle
against Al Qaeda. The U.S. had shown little interest in Pakistan after vacating the
country once the Soviets had been defeated in Afghanistan, but after 9/11 Pakistan once
again became central to U.S. foreign policy. The War on Terror had opened another
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episode in U.S./Pakistan relations. General Pervez Musharaff came to power in Pakistan
in a 1999 military coup. He became President of Pakistan in June 2001, and held power
in the country when Osama Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda network destroyed the World Trade
Center towers in New York City. America recruited the Musharaff government to assist
the U.S. against Bin Laden and the Taliban in the aftermath of 9/11.
Developing a viable democracy in Pakistan has been secondary to U.S. security
interests in the country. When a legitimate democratic political movement takes shape in
Pakistan the U.S. will hesitate to support that movement if it jeopardizes the political
stability of the nation during a national security episode such as the War on Terror. This
was the case with Benazir Bhutto. She returned to Pakistan in October of 2007 to run in
national elections scheduled to take place the following January. Like her father, she
believed in the establishment of a democratic Pakistan. The U.S. did not support her
political goals to any significant degree for the sake of protecting its partnership with the
Musharaff military regime which had become an ally against Al Qaeda and was involved
in the hunt for Osama Bin Laden. America’s post 9/11 partnership with Musharaff made
him the best ally in the War on Terror, and Benazir’s antagonism toward Musharaff’s
government threatened to upset the stability of the country at a time when the U.S.
needed political stability intact.
The U.S. understood that the military establishment held power in Pakistan, and
Bhutto had previously been ousted from her office as Prime Minister on two occasions.
Her ability to hold and exercise power in Pakistan was doubtful based on her past
experience. “Dismissed twice as Prime Minister, she often complained of being in office
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but not in power.”325 Bhutto found that her popular base was insufficient to oppose a
firmly entrenched military and religious political hierarchy. For the U.S. to support
Bhutto would have been admirable and consistent with democratic values, but it would
have jeopardized the U.S. alliance with Pakistan in the War on Terror should Bhutto fail.
America could not risk alienating the Musharaff regime, and needed its help in the hunt
for Osama Bin Laden. In 2007 the U.S. was more concerned about its short-term goals in
the War on Terror than any long-term goals related to a democratic Pakistan.
Benazir Bhutto became the target of two assassination attempts in the three month
period prior to elections. Although Bhutto survived the first assassination attempt in
October which involved twin bomb blasts and sniper-fire, she did not survive the second
assassination attempt. She was killed on December 27, 2007. Bhutto was assassinated in
Pakistan before democratic elections could take place. Rage mounted in the streets and
President Musharraf called for restraint.326 After Bhutto’s assassination Musharaff would
resign his military commission in order to become a civilian president, a political charade
designed to bolster his legitimacy in late 2007. Musharraf would eventually resign his
office as President in 2008 in the face of impeachment proceedings against him, and
leave Pakistan to live in London in self-imposed exile. Asif Ali Zardari, the husband of
the late Benazir Bhutto, “easily won the September 2008 presidential elections.”327
General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani took charge of the Pakistani military in the wake
of Musharraf’s resignation and is considered the nation’s most powerful official today.
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Kayani is a shadow figure looming over Zardari’s administration. In many ways Zardari
is in office but not in power, just like his late wife, Benazir, had claimed during her years
in office. According to the New York Times, “Although a civilian government led by
President Asif Ali Zardari is in power…General Kayani makes all the vital strategic
decisions.”328 Forty years after the South Asia Crisis, in May, 2011, America’s most
notorious public enemy, Osama Bin Laden, was discovered and killed in Pakistan. The
American raid into Pakistan that resulted in the death of the Al Qaeda leader enraged the
Pakistani military. “Kayani said that he would not tolerate a repeat of such a raid.”329
The incident was considered a violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty330 in that it took place
without the prior knowledge of Pakistan’s government.331 The raid caused Kayani
embarrassment over the legitimacy of Pakistan’s security and he had to fight to maintain
his position.332 Questions arose as to how Bin Laden could be living in the military
garrison city of Abbottabad without the Pakistani military being aware of his presence.
The fact that the U.S. invaded the Bin Laden compound without first telling the Pakistani
military of its plans, illustrates that the level of trust existing in U.S./Pakistani relations
today is very low.
In the immediate wake of the Bin Laden execution, an unsigned memorandum
surfaced in Pakistan on October of 2011 requesting the support of the United States “to
curb the military’s influence and avert a possible coup.”333 Kayani demanded a Supreme
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Court investigation to determine if the memo originated with the Zardari government.334
“Kayani dispelled the speculations of any military takeover,” but stated that “there can be
no compromise on national security.”335 Kayani did little to relieve anxiety over a
possible coup by the military.336 Pakistani ambassador to Washington, Husain Haqqani,
was the person behind the memorandum which was sent to U.S. Admiral Mike Mullen,
“just days after Bin Laden was killed in Pakistan.”337 “The memo was allegedly an
attempt to enlist U.S. help to head off a feared military coup”338 by Pakistani military
leaders concerned about national security. “Zardari reportedly feared that the military
might seize power in a bid to limit the damaging fallout”339 of the Bin Laden
assassination in Pakistan. Kayani’s demands left a clear impression about who was in
charge in Pakistan, and the Zardari government had good reason to be nervous about a
military coup. There were multiple precedents for military takeovers of government in
Pakistan’s history allegedly to restore order and to protect the national security.
Pakistan has a history of Military/Islamic cooperation since the days of General
Zia ul-Haq in the 1970s. Today in Pakistan “many in the lower ranks of the military have
more sympathy for the militant groups than for the United States.”340 The
Military/Islamic establishment will give a nod to democracy because it understands the
need to govern with the approval and support of the people based on the Bhutto legacy,
but both the Pakistani military and the Islamists believe in autocratic rule.
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Democratically elected civilian leaders are not taken seriously in Pakistan because when
Pakistan’s generals control the military instead of a civilian president having that
authority, the generals can intervene and seize political power anytime they choose.
Some speculate “that the military would prefer to rule without challenge, but behind a
civilian façade.”341 The military establishment in Pakistan has a traditional collusion
with extreme Islamic elements, and together they pose a consistent threat to democratic
civilian authority in the country.
The U.S. maintains its episodic approach to foreign policy in the Third World
today. America’s impatience with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and its desire for a
hasty military withdrawal from both countries demonstrates that the present American
episode in the War on Terror is coming to an end. After its military goals in Iraq had
been achieved, the U.S. evacuated its forces, but continued to address its challenges in
Afghanistan. The Afghan war continues to be fought by U.S. troops in an effort to
contain the possible resurgence of the Taliban and its Islamic terrorist network. U.S.
relations with Pakistan are strained due to the American military raid that killed Osama
Bin Laden, and America has determined to bring U.S. troops home from Afghanistan as
soon as possible. U.S. foreign policy related to the War on Terror once more suggests a
get-in and get-out approach to the Third World by the United States.
Modern Pakistan in 2012 faces an uncertain future. The threat of Pakistan’s
military once again seizing power in the country is an ever-present possibility. The
modern civilian government of Asif Ali Zardari faces the possibility of another military
coup today, which would once more bring Pakistan under the control of an autocratic
military dictatorship led by Kayani. Pakistan is considered one of the most dangerous
341
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places in the world today due to its possession of nuclear weapons, an ongoing unstable
political situation, and the ubiquitous presence of militant Islam. If the United States
follows its historical pattern of evacuating Afghanistan and Pakistan once its military
goals related to the War on Terror are resolved, then it will embolden Pakistan’s military
establishment to seize power once more, and it will weaken Pakistan’s civilian
government.
If the United States moves on to other concerns, leaving the Afghans and the
Pakistanis to care for their own problems once America has dealt with its security
concerns in the region, then the Islamic/Military partnership in Pakistan can only grow
stronger. The Islamic extremists will continue to migrate between Afghanistan and
Pakistan at their leisure, secure in their mountainous terrain, and it will allow them to
boast that they have beaten the Americans just like they beat the Soviets during the Cold
War. If the War on Terror is reduced to just another American wartime episode, a quick
get-in and get-out strategy, then the Muslim world will maintain its “disillusionment and
cynicism”342 regarding Western democracy. Military autocracy and Islamic extremism
will continue to dominate Pakistan. The South Asia Crisis was short in its duration, but it
revealed an American tendency to act in an episodic fashion according to its short-term
interests in Pakistan. The U.S. has often failed to give adequate regard to long-term
issues in its relations with Pakistan. The potential problems that can arise as a result have
been largely ignored. In modern times, the evidence suggests that the U.S. continues its
episodic approach and short-term focus where Pakistan is concerned.
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